The question inPart Iwas: what is the nature of religious credence (or “belief”)as a psychological state? And a puzzle arose because neither the simple model nor the cynical model of religious “belief” was adequate. To rehash, the psychological data fromJustin Barrett and Frank Keilshow this: people think, remember, and reasonabout Godin ways that go contrary to their professed religious “beliefs.” The puzzle is this: what then shall we say about those “beliefs”? Do people reallybelievethem?

The simple model, recall, says that religious people who profess that God is (say) omnipresent simplybelievethat God is everywhere, just like you or I believe grass is green. The cynical model says that the religious who profess thisdon’tbelieve it; they are onlypretending相信。这个简单的模型似乎是错误的，因为它表明心理数据应该有所不同;这种愤世嫉俗的模式似乎是错误的，因为它未能捕捉到宗教“信仰”的真诚——大多数自称有宗教信仰的人，似乎并没有在他们“信仰”的问题上撒谎。那么我们该怎么说呢?

My proposal contrasts with both models. According to thereligious credence model, there are in fact twodistinctinternal mental attitudes—superficially similar—both of which often go by the name “belief.” But they differ in important respects on close inspection. If I’m right, then saying that the religious do or don’t “believe” in omnipresence (the simple model or the cynical model) will bemisleading either way.

Consider two so-called “beliefs.” One is in the mind of James, who isn’t up to speed on which world leaders are still alive. The other is in the mind of Terry, a devout Christian:

1. 詹姆斯相信#玛格丽特·撒切尔还活着。
2. Terry believes* Jesus Christ is alive.

James remembers famous leaders and, in a matter of fact way, takes some to be alive and others not. But Terry regards the contents she “believes” with reverence; she regards them in a way that makes her attitude part of her very identity. So the attitudes expressed by “believes#” and “believes*” are different. Accordingly, the religious credence model posits two different kinds of attitudes,factual beliefandreligious credence.

Let’s return to the Barrett and Keil study and the so-called “belief” in God’s omnipresence. Recall that people who professed this “belief” tended to remember and reasonas thoughthey represented God as limited in time and space.

My model says that people who profess God’s omnipresence typically have areligious credencethat God is everywhere, even though they do not have a factual belief to this effect. And this lack of factual belief partly accounts for the experimental results. Barrett goes onin another workto argue that ourintuitive关于代理的信仰也倾向于将代理(包括上帝)视为有限的，与一个人的“神学上正确的信仰”相反。在我看来，巴雷特在神学上正确的信仰只是更广泛的宗教信仰的一个子集。

Now two questions arise. First, what features exactly differentiate religious credence from factual belief? Second, how different really is the credence model from the cynical model? (After all, Iamsaying that the so-called “believer” doesn’tfactually believe讨论中的宗教主张。)

I can’t go intofull detailon the first question—let alone provide suitable arguments—but here’s a sketch of my view.

Factual belief is the attitude we mostly take toward mundane contents that help us navigate the world, likethere is a ditch in front of meorOregon is north of California. Factual beliefs are available for guiding inferences and actions inallpractical settings, and they tend to beextinguished by evidence contrary to them. Even if we’re in a special setting—like in church or on stage—we use factual beliefs to track the objects and events around us.

Religious credences, by way of contrast, give one a sense of virtue and direction in life, whenever one uses them to guide actions. Credences also play a role in constituting one’s social identity. On the flip side, however, they typically don’t guide action when one’s life direction, religion, or social identity isnot在的问题。你听过“基督徒一周一次”这句话吗?This phrase captures the idea, now backed byanthropological research, that many religious “beliefs” (credences) don’t guide behavior outside certain special situations. Furthermore, religious credences do not tend to be extinguished by evidence in the way that factual beliefs are. Rather, evidence that would seem to go contrary to religious credences gets folded into a larger religious narrative.

This all allows us now to answer the second question. On the cynical model, the religious agent islyingabout her beliefs—merely pretending. On the credence model, the religious agent sincerely holds a positive attitude that gives social and moral orientation in her life. It is not the case on the credence model that the religious agent knowingly believes contrary to her credences (as the cynical model would suggest). Rather, those “beliefs” (credences!) are just an importantly different kind of state altogether.