能请到Martha Nussbaum来做哲学讲座真是太棒了。中国伊朗亚洲杯比赛直播像罗伯特·诺齐克(Robert Nozick)、约翰·塞尔(John Searle)、大卫·刘易斯(David Lewis)和其他一些哲学家一样，玛莎是其中之一，他们似乎能创造出比人类所能创造出的更有趣的哲学，而且不仅仅是通过重复自己的观点，而是凭借源源不断的原创见解。

在节目中，我对努斯鲍姆对情感的认知方式持怀疑态度，我使用了“原始关怀”这样的短语。Ken在他的博客中提到了这一点，似乎不太确定我的意思。好吧，我也不太确定，但我会在这里稍微考虑一下这个想法。我对这个话题的最初想法有两个根源，一个是基于个人经验，另一个是基于相当理论性的考虑。我将只讨论前一个....

I agree with Nussbaum that how we think of future possibilities has a lot to do with our emotions. If I think that X is going to have a root canal, I am filled with sympathy. Well, not filled, but I have some sympathy for X. If I realize that X is me, a whole different set of emotions rise in my breast, or brain, or heart, or wherever emotions are taken to arise these days. Fear, based on anticipation of pain and discomfort, replaces sympathy. The first-personal perspective is crucial. This is true even for emotions that are not self-centered in the ordinary sense. I may make sacrifices for the benefit of some other being, but somewhere in my conception of that other being will be some relation to me: my wife, or my children, or my country, or the world my children and grandchildren are going to live in. I would probably be willing to sacrifice my life to bring about peace and justice in the earth's future; it's my planet, after all. But I doubt I would do so for peace and justice in the future of Mars, and almost certainly not for peace and justice in Vulcan or some other planet outside our own solar system, unless I thought that peace and justice there would prevent, say, a future invasion of Earth.

然而，在思考欲望时，区分欲望的客体和欲望的主体或拥有者是至关重要的。如果X希望Y过得愉快，那么X是占有者，Y是客体。即使我希望过得愉快，我们仍然需要区分。利己主义者有时会混淆真理，即只有我们自己的欲望激励着我们，而错误的是，我们是所有激励我们的欲望的对象。这在理论上是可能的，而且据我所知，一件高尚的事情就是拥有一些与我们无关的欲望，当然，我们很多人都有一些欲望这些欲望对他们从生到死的一连串经历没有任何影响。

相反，在我看来，占有人和客体之间的关系并不能保证占有人会关心客体发生了什么。即使身份。据我所知，这在理论上是可能的，我完全知道如果我不动，我就会被一辆公共汽车碾过，但我不在乎。我并不是说我可能宁愿被车辗过也不愿不被车辗过;当然，人们会进入一种状态，他们希望糟糕的事情发生在自己身上。我的意思是不管怎样。与我有关的即将发生的事情根本不能激起我的任何激情。我也不在乎所以我没有动力去做任何事情。我不知道这种情况是否真的发生过，但嗜睡、抑郁和类似的经历似乎与这种情况很接近。

我认为最终刺激我们的是感觉和对感觉的预期。任何处于疼痛中的有机体都会试图改变自己的处境，使自己不再疼痛。它在乎自己是否痛苦。疼痛是一种内在激励的状态，或者至少是自然激励的状态。这和激励是不一样的;人类可以通过各种方式进行训练或下药，这样疼痛就不会困扰他们。但它不需要训练来激发疼痛。这是自然规律。这大概就是疼痛的作用，大自然赋予我们承受疼痛的能力。正如休谟所指出的那样，我们本希望一个完美的上帝能带来更好的东西——也许是一种或多或少持续不断的半情爱快感，扩散到我们的全身，当我们受伤时，这种快感会减弱。 If I twist my ankle, and then walk on it, the semi-erotic pleasure based in my ankle disappears and I quickly stop and limp so it comes back. But Mother Nature does it with pain. Mother Nature, as we know, has rather peculiar goals for Her creations: that they stay alive long enough to procreate, so that there will be plenty of things of their own kind for other things to eat, so they can procreate. So pain is a fine device for her to use.

As Nussbaum rightly observes, there is no one to one correlation between emotions, like despair and joy, and the feelings that are a part of having the emotions. Still, there seems to be a collection of emotional-feelings, that are naturally motivating, the sorts of feelings one wishes not to have or wishes to have and continue having, that are involved in a complex way with our emotional life. It seems to me that no judgment, no matter how certain, how first-personal, or how vividly focussed on, can motivate us without being tied to some of these naturally motivating feelings. While there is not a one to one correlation, there are complex patterns.

我并不是说纳斯鲍姆的理论不能解释这一点，我当然也不是说她把自我作为占有者和自我作为客体混为一谈就像我在一些利己主义者身上看到的那样。但如果我有一个关于情绪的理论，我会把关心哪些未来的可能性被实现这一原始现象置于其核心，即拥有不同的愉快和不愉快的感觉，最终与对自然激发的痛苦和快乐的预期和记忆有关。但是，也许我没有关于情绪的理论就好了。