our whole problem today is the fact we believe what is not true, and the truth matters over all things, it really is bliss and will set you free

肯引入了“可用性谬误”的概念。他给出了这样的格言:“如果对日常生活而言，相信安慰性的谎言会更有用，那么就去相信吧。”
Notice that Ken says, "serviceable for the purposes of ordinary life." Serviceability always exists in relation to some end, goal or purpose, in relation to which something may or may not be serviceable. There is no serviceability tout court, in all possible circumstances, independent of ends or purposes.
日常生活是否应该成为使用能力的标准?难道不存在不同寻常的目的吗?与之相关的信仰可能相当有用，即使它们可能“对日常生活的目的”不有用?
许多灵性道路评估信仰的有效性不是通过诉诸于普通生活，而是通过诉诸于不属于普通生活领域的目的、目的和目标。例如，当一个印度教徒或佛教徒相信重生时，她认为我们的存在远远超出了我们的日常生活，包括无数的之前的出生，以及可能无限的未来的出生。
The same goes for political activism. In the 1970s movie Soylent Green, Charlton Heston's character discovers the truth that the food soylent green is really made out of humans, not the vegetable matter which the government claimed. This belief was in many ways disastrous for the purposes of ordinary life, as Heston's character's demise at the end of the movie attests. But this belief was also important, and for Heston's character it was worth risking all to find out if it was true.
When we turn our attention to science, we find practices which aim at acquiring true beliefs, even though these beliefs might be contrary to or subversive of "the purposes of ordinary life." For example, knowledge that the Earth is round might be indifferent or contrary to the purposes of ordinary life, but for a geologist or astronomer it is still useful to believe such things, and a good astronomer or geologist will believe it.
To me, this discussion cannot take place without talking about autonomy. There is a connection between autonomy and false belief. When we act on the basis of false belief, we give up our autonomy. If we value autonomy unconditionally, then we will want to have true beliefs even though they may be unserviceable in certain circumstances or respects. If we do not value autonomy unconditionally, then we will accept false beliefs if they are serviceable for this or that particular end.
那么问题就来了，我们如何评价自主性?我们对它漠不关心吗?我们允许有例外吗?在某些情况下，我们更喜欢较少的自主权吗?

近似假吗?
Ken suggests that truth is not an all-or-nothing affair. Approximately true beliefs are, strictly speaking, false. And yet many approximately true beliefs turn out to be quite useful. Many geometry problems come to a useful resolution by assuming that pi = 3.14, even though, strictly speaking, this is false.
Ken describes this kind of belief as a "serviceable falsehood" that exhibits "truth by approximation," and I think his point can be summed up by saying that truth comes in degrees. It's more true to say that pi = 3.14 than to say that it equals 3.15, even though both claims are, strictly speaking, false. On this view, there aren't just two truth values, true and false, but more than two, with the addition of various degrees of "approximately true."
I hate to say it, but I find this view of things unconvincing. Let me explain why. To me, the simplest theory of truth that is powerful enough to account for our truth-talk holds that every proposition is either true or false, and that no proposition is both true and false. There is no third possibility, partially true or partially false, or what have you. So, is the sentence 'pi = 3.14' true or false? Well, that depends....
It depends on how the sentence 'pi = 3.14' is being used. If it is being used to express approximation, then the sentence is true. If it is not being used to express approximation, then 'pi = 3.14' is false. These are the only possibilities so far as truth is concerned.
There is no "false but aproximately true" option. Instead, what we require is an account of meaning that is sufficiently complex to distinguish between the strict meaning of a sentence, on one hand, and the approximate meaning of a sentence, on the other hand. 'pi = 3.14' is true when the sentence has approximate meaning; false when it does not have approximate meaning.
如果我说的是正确的，那么近似与意义有关，而不是真相。如果一个信念的内容本身是近似的，那么这个信念就可以近似真理而不假。如果一个句子的意思是近似的，那么它可能是近似正确而不是错误的。
In short, when we say that 'pi = 3.14' is approximately true, we're not saying that there is a third truth value, approximately true. Rather, we're saying that the meaning of 'pi = 3.14' is such that, when it is approximate, it is true. Otherwise, we multiply truth values unnecessarily.

I agree that "serviceable falsehoods " are really truths.
I agree that approximations are truths.
I disagree however that every proposition is either true or false. That view, at least if unqualified, leads to confusion and problems.
所以如何?
Here's how I like to sort matters out. At least to a point.
Truth is ultimately a utilitarian concept. Utility is defined by desires. Whether a given proposition is true or not depends on the attending desires.
Desires are variable from person to person and also, with respect to a particular individual, from time to time.
Thus in the collective sense (among multiple persons) a given proposition can be true and false at the same time; and true on one occasion but false on another.
As just one example, no measurement of the length of any physical object can ever be known to be or not be the "true" length of the object being measured because of the inherent imprecision of such affairs and/or as a consequence of the mind/matter dichotomy.
A proposition can be "either only true or only false" only in the context of a single person and at a single time.
Truth is ultimately subjective.
真理只存在于一个语境中——个人的意识和他/她的欲望的语境中——(以及，在物质世界的语境中)——不能被知道绝对存在。
也因为唯我论(一个人的欲望最终不被另一个人知道)，真理是主观的和非普遍的。
真理有关系吗?是的，因为欲望很重要。
(What about logical truths? Is it not absolute truth that x = x ? But there may be persons or beings who can comprehend otherwise so I would say even these are subjective. The only way human beings can understand things is in terms of their desires so for human beings everything is subjective. Even if god handed me an absolute truth I could not know it as such because the only terms in which I can comprehend it is through my desires. Well then if I am convinced that I see that something is absolute truth is it then absolute truth? I suppose so for me who sees that but not for others who don't. And then we're right back to our same old philosophic problems.)
的愿望是什么?它是意识的一种表现。但意识本身是无法解释的。
Explaining consciousness would seem to offer the hope of resolving the problem of solipsism, the mind/matter dichotomy and would allow for universal and absolute truth.

Truth: serviceability or correspondence?
The claim that truth be defined as serviceability in relation to individual desire, in my opinion fails to handle -- indeed cannot handle -- the concept of truth.
Take, for example, persons A and B who disagree about whether Jones is good. A says Jones is good; B says Jones isn't good. Now, if Jones is serving the interests of A's desire, but not serving the interests of B's desire, then there is no disagreement. A and B are both right; their claims are both "true." Thus we are presented with an aporia: A and B make contrary claims (both can not be true), and yet their claims do not disagree (both can be true).
Indeed, one wonders how there could be any genuine disagreement at all. I say it tastes great; you say no, it's less filling. So long as each truth serves our respective desires, we would not really be disagreeing. That seems absurd. We live in a world in which disagreement over good and bad, right and wrong, are important features of life, features that it would be foolish to drop simply because we've decided at long last to define truth as serviceability for subjective desire. I believe it's wrong to invade Iraq; the president believes it's right. Great! No disagreement here. Winston in the book 1984 believes that 2 + 2 = 4; his torturer claims it equals five. Awesome! No disagreement here.
Consider what happens to our concept of meaning if truth gets defined as serviceability for individual desire, not correspondence with reality. Usually we take language, beliefs, maps,. etc., to be about something. This about-ness, meaning or intentionality, possessed by beliefs and the like, is one of the facts being explained by a correspondence theory of truth. It's because the content of a belief somehow fits the world that we say it is true. We call this fit correspondence. Not because we're trying to denounce personal preference, but because we're trying to account for the fact of meaning.
考虑一下我们的原因概念发生了什么。通常我们认为现实会让真实的信念成为真实的。如果“猫在垫子上”这句话是真的，那是因为猫真的在垫子上。但如果我们试图将真理定义为欲望的可服务性，而不是与现实的对应，那么真理的这种因果特征就会消失。仅仅是我的欲望，而不是世界的样子，使我相信它是真实的。一旦这种与现实的因果联系被切断，任何试图将我们的知识与现实再次联系起来的尝试，最多也就是有问题的。什么时候一个断言是正确的?当它符合我们的愿望。我们怎么知道它是否符合我们的愿望?我们不能。我们被困在一种与欲望一致的无休止的倒退中。 We can't even know what does and doesn't conform with our desire because we can't ever get to the bottom of things. If we balk at this and say that in the case of knowledge truth is different, then we have multiplied the meaning of the word 'truth' into a general sense (function of desire) and a special sense (knowledge-truth, not a function of desire). At this point things start smelling very fishy.
最后，关于假设，我实际上同意可服务性在这里确实发挥了重要作用。例如，20世纪数学领域最重要的工作就是假设等式“0 = 1”是错误的。这相当于假设数学是一致的。我们不能证明数学是一致的。但是我们可以假设。这是一个很有用的假设。即便如此，如果一个假设真的为真，它为真并不是因为它符合我们的愿望，而是因为它符合现实。所以即使在假设的情况下，对应仍然是真理的仲裁者。
In conclusion, a correspondence theory of truth matches our beliefs about how knowledge and meaning work, and about how reality causes true beliefs to be true. Serviceability does not. If serviceability does play a role for truth, it's in helping us decide which assumptions to make. When we must decide whether a claim is true, we may consider serviceability; but as to whether the claim itself really is true or not, correspondence is the final arbiter.

One area in which serviceable falsehoods reign is in the area of politics. For instance, we are lead to believe that the death penalty make us safer because it is a deterent. Of course, that is false. But it is widely believed and used as a argument in favor of the death penalty.
我们告诉人们他们的选票很重要，以支持我们的民主理念。然而，普通公民的一票几乎没有什么作用。认为electorial大学生……
This idea of the servicable falsehoods may be offensive to some, but it is quite true in many areas. Politics is just one where there happens to be allot of examples.

Correspondence is an unworkable proposition because there is nothing known or experienced beyond one's experiences to which correspondence can be made.
That which human beings experience consists of experiences and comprises neither causes of experiences nor independently existing objects.
除了自己的经验之外，没有任何证据能证明任何事物的存在。没有任何证据表明经验的原因存在，或者独立存在的物体具有与人自己的经验相同的证据性质。
Within the context of experience, moreover, both existence and meaning are functions of desire. I cannot be aware of anything which does not affect my state of desire in at least some way. Nothing can be said to exist that does not affect my state of desire in at least some way. I cannot verify, report upon, communicate about or do anything with respect to anything about which I have no desires at all. Desire defines meaning, existence and truth.
Understanding existence, meaning and truth as functions of desire does nothing deleterious to the concepts of correspondence, aboutness or causality. The concerns cited in the previous essay are inherent and have been there all along. They are the classic philosophic problems of solipsism, mind-matter dysjunction and that of supposed-but-never-proven independent existence. They count among the most fundamental reasons for which this philosophy forum exists. They are the very same problems about which we keep trying to achieve satisfactory states of understanding.
至于“不同意”，一个人想在特定的环境下做一件事，而另一个人想做另一件事，按任何人的标准都构成了“不同意”。在这里谈论真理是多余的。真理是一个衍生的概念，当人们用基本的术语说话时，甚至不需要引入它。我做我想做的。你想怎么做就怎么做。不仅如此，事实上我会做我有足够欲望去做的事你也会做你有足够欲望去做的事我们都不会去做我们没有足够欲望去做的事真相见鬼去吧。所以如何?因为真理是仅次于欲望的衍生概念。欲望比真理更重要。欲望定义真理。 Truth outside of the context of desire is meaningless and worthless. Like currency without value. It's pointless.

What do you think of the "Gospel of Judas." How much more ancient wisdom is still hidden?

真相很重要。然而，真理是相对重要的，应该被认为是如此。真理和真理是并存的。你的邻居可能是一位在伊拉克失去一条腿的老兵。但这个真理只对少数人重要。另一个事实是，许多国家都在战争和杀戮。这个示例比前面的示例稍微重要一些。
However, I have concluded after long years of study and serious contemplation of what I have learned both from books and the world around me, that the answers to the things which have perplexed mankind throughout his history and today have simple answers if we take the obvious path of commonsense and do not allow ourselves to be sidetracked by issues of little or no importance.
有些基本真理是最重要的，之后我们可以考虑次要的真理。

Reply: Correspondence vs. Serviceability for Desire
Are there criteria we can apply to decide which is best among alternative theories of truth? I think there are at least three. First, there is a descriptive criterion: does a theory of truth describe all (and only) instances of truth? Second, there is a normative criterion: does a theory of truth express what is right and wrong, good and bad, obligatory and forbidden, with regard to truth? Third, there is a prescriptive criterion: does a theory of truth provide instructions for how to find the truth?
Let's consider the descriptive criterion first. Does a theory of truth describe the world? Consider Mr. A, who learns that he will most likely die very soon, perhaps from some disease, or by the order of some judge. The correspondence theory of truth handles this by identifying a sentence, 'Mr. A will soon die.', and asserting that this sentence corresponds with reality. The serviceability-for-desire theory of truth, however, has difficulty identifying the sentence 'Mr. A will soon die.' as true. Is it true for Mr. A? Only if he desires to believe that he will soon die. Perhaps he does desire this in some cases; but we'll agree that in the vast majority of cases Mr. A desires not to believe that his death is imminent. So for the serviceability theory, in the vast majority of cases the sentence 'Mr. A will soon die.' is false for Mr. A, even though it's true ex hypothesi. The serviceability-for-desire theory fails to correctly sort between true and false sentences, and thus fails the first criterion test.
Now let's consider the normative criterion. Does a theory of truth express what is right and wrong, good and bad, obligatory and forbidden, with regard to truth? The correspondence theory holds that Mr. A can rightly be said to have knowledge only if his belief corresponds with reality. Mr. A can rightly be said to know the sentence 'Mr. A will soon die.' is true only if it really is the case that he will soon die. The serviceability-for-desire theory, however, holds that Mr. A can rightly be said to know only if the truth of the sentence 'Mr. A will soon die.' is serviceable with respect to Mr. A's desire. Again, in the vast majority of cases Mr. A will desire to believe that he will not die soon. But according to the serviceability theory, he can rightly be said to know that he will soon die only if he desires to believe that he will soon die. If Mr. A desires to believe that he will not die soon, then according to the serviceability theory he can't rightly be said to know that he will soon die! So the serviceability-for-desire theory of truth fails this second test.
Finally, let's consider the prescriptive criterion. Does a theory of truth provide instructions for how to find the truth? The correspondence theory holds that in order to find the truth -- in order for Mr. A to decide whether or not to believe he will die soon -- one must examine reality. The serviceability-for-desire theory, however, claims that in order to find the truth, one must examine one's desire. In order for Mr. A to decide whether to believe he will die soon, he must figure out whether he desires to believe it. Again, we agreed that in the vast majority of cases, Mr. A desires to believe that he will not die soon, in which case the serviceability theory instructs him to reject 'Mr. A will soon die.' as false.
But now, a serviceability-for-desire theorist might claim that if Mr. A desires to stay alive, he must believe the truth when he is sick or facing execution, in order to take action and maximize his chance of survival. Unfortunately, the utility theorist can't do this. For in order to take this path, in order for Mr. A to believe that he is to die soon even when he desires to believe that he will not die soon, the serviceability theorist must become a correspondence theorist! The serviceability theorist must grant that there is a reality with which at least some true sentences correspond, and in relation to which serviceability for desire is ultimately determined. This is the only way I see by which a serviceability theorist can explain why Mr. A would find it useful to believe that he will soon die, even when he desires to believe that he will NOT soon die.
So, in all three cases, serviceability-for-desire fails to pass muster.
Is there more to be said about truth? You bet! However, if the serviceability theory of truth can not meet these three criteria (descriptive, normative, and prescriptive), then in my opinion it's a non-starter for serious consideration. I would ask serviceability-for-desire advocates to examine these three problems, and to offer viable solutions to them, before I write more on this topic.

关于上述描述性标准测试，人们必须考虑欲望的整个背景，而不是仅仅孤立地考虑单一的欲望。假设A先生有强烈的不死欲望。有人告诉他，他要死了。如果消息来源是不可信的(即在过去没有满足他的欲望)，那么从平衡上看，忽略消息来源可能更能满足他的欲望，这样他就会相信自己不会死。如果消息来源是可信的，他会发现自己对试图忽视消息来源感到不满，他可能会到处相信他会死，即使他希望不死。
(Both of these scenarios describe how Mr. A will probably comport himself regardless of what actually eventually happens as regards his dying. A source that is not credible may turn out to be correct and a credible source may be lying.)
In this case the desire to believe one is not going to die fails to overpower the dissatisfaction in believing the credible source is in error. One cannot say a priori what desire will predominate in a given individual. There are of course cases where one's desire to believe one is not going to die overwhelms all other desires and the individual rejects the view of all authorities. Such persons are said to be in denial. And here let me also say that if someone really and totally believes something then that constitutes reality and "truth" for that person and if I could experience their experiences then I suppose it would be truth for me as well. Thus if an individual who appears to me to be dying insists they are prerfectly fine even though I see their body deteriorating well if I could experience what they are experiencing maybe I would see things in a completely different manner. Maybe such persons never experience death. In the final analysis it is what they (one) experience that counts for them (one's self). "I am not dying. I am fine. You just think I'm dying." Well maybe if I could experience their universe it would be a whole different place.
It all goes back to "Reality and truth are what one experiences, not what "is" independently of one's experience, which "independent being" cannot be known.
I do not have time now to look at the other two tests. I will try to get back later, although I have a three day driving trip to Albuquerque this week!

I agree with Paul Hollander that the bit about approximations was unfortunate in that Ken appeared to be using a true approximation to illustrate the two other quite different concepts of approximate truth and serviceable falsehood. But in fact the issue of whether a proposition must be either true or false is really just a matter of how we define "proposition". If (as some do) we define a proposition as a statement which is either true or false then indeed a proposition must be either true or false. But then with that "strong" definition of proposition, "Truth Matters" is not a proposition.
Perhaps "Truth matters to me at this time" is closer to being a proposition in the strong sense, but despite my own strong sense of a unitary identity I am aware of research which shows that sense to be an illusion, so I may actually be of several minds simultaneously on the matter of whether truth matters.
But I do believe it does (at least approximately).

In advocating the serviceability-for-desire theory of truth, ses uses such phrases as "what actually eventually happens," "someone really and totally believes something," etc. Such appeals to reality indicate that the serviceability theorist has turned into a correspondence theorist! Which is exactly my point: the serviceability-for-desire theorist is parasitic off the correspondence theorist, sneaking in hidden assumptions about what reality is really like, while at the same time claiming that truth is purely a matter of serviceability. This is simply inconsistent.
If the truth-as-serviceability-for-desire advocate desires to be consistent, then he/she ought to abandon truth-as-serviceability-for-desire.
I don't deny that psychology affects belief. But truth and belief are two different things. I think the serviceability theorist is motivated by a sincere desire to acknowledge the important role that desire plays relative to belief. This is great. But I think things get confused with the additional claim that truth, and not just belief, is a function of desire.
Protagoras's words come to mind: "Of all things the measure is people: of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not."
只要它指的是信念，这是很简单的。
However, when it is taken to refer to truth, it becomes absurd.
Rather than argue the point myself, I would refer the interested reader to two philosophical classics: Plato's Theaetetus, and Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Gamma. In the Theaetetus Socrates at one point confronts the ghost of Protagoras (actually, his imagined revivified head sticking up out of the ground) over the very claim I quote above. Aristotle picks up where Plato leaves off, identifying principles such as the so-called Law of Excluded Middle (that no proposition/sentence/statement/belief is both true and false) as necessary conditions for meaningful communication.
PS: Alan Cooper -- 'Truth matters.' is a grammatical English sentence which states that truth matters. So why do you deny that 'Truth matters.' expresses a proposition?

(Replying to Paul)
I did not deny that "Truth matters" expresses a proposition - only that it satisfies a particular possible definition of "proposition". If any "grammatical English sentence" qualifies as a proposition, then "Truth matters" is indeed a proposition, but then it is not true that a proposition must be either True or False. On the other hand if a proposition must be either true or false, then I do submit that "Truth matters" is not a proposition since its truth value depends on context and interpretation.
"Flatulence transcends verbiage" is also a grammatical English sentence whose truth value depends on the context. In a certain kind of boring lecture and with an appropriate interpretation of the word "transcends" it may well be true, but in other contexts it might be false. Most people would probably agree that this is an example which shows that "truth always matters" is false, but to an innocent on death row it is probably obvious that "truth sometimes matters" is true. Without the modifier, the simple sentence "Truth matters" is grammatical but ambiguous - so not a proposition in the "strict" sense.
-Alan

I think there are three different questions to answer: (1) Does the sentence 'Truth matters.' express a proposition? (2) Which proposition does 'Truth matters.' express? (3) What is the content of a "complete" proposition?
We can answer (1) without answering (2) or (3). Does 'Truth matters.' express a proposition? Yes. Why? Because it is a grammatical English sentence.
我们可以不回答(3)而回答(2)。哪个命题“真相重要”?“表达?真理很重要的命题。这是一个简单的反引号问题:对于任何句子，“S”的意思(在单引号中，提到这个句子)是S(不是在单引号中，使用一个“that”子句)。有些人喜欢用双引号来代替:“S”的意思是“S”，而“S”是一个命题。在任何一种情况下，问题都是通过一种循环(这不是真正的循环，因为它取决于对象语言和元语言之间的区别)来解决的。
就(3)而言，我发现“真理重要”这一命题已经完整的观点是合理的。这其中的一个原因是“真相很重要”。’是一个合乎语法的句子。另一个原因是，它似乎描绘了一种世界可能的方式，无需进一步阐述。这句话是关于什么的?真理。它对真理的肯定是什么?它很重要。这是世界可能的样子吗?是的，当然:当且仅当真理重要时，命题为真。
现在，有人可能会争辩说，“真理很重要”这个命题并不能真正描绘出世界可能的样子，因为事实从来没有变得更简单。真理只对这个或那个人重要，在这个或那个时候，等等。也许。但在这一点上，争论的焦点不是“真相重要”是否是一个完整的命题，而是“真相重要”是否正确!很明显，如果我们在争论它是否正确，那么我们已经接受了我们正在处理一个完整的命题!
Again, I think mistakes get made when problems for meaning are erroneously regarded as problems for truth.
So far as whether there are only two truth values, or more than two, I would repeat what I wrote earlier, that the simplest theory capable of accounting for our truth-talk is a theory positing just two truth values, true and false. This is not the only theory of truth; just the simplest. Of course, Occam's razor asks us to go for the simplest complete explanation, so there you go, IMHO....

Sorry Paul, I must be a bit dense. I can't help reading what you say as asserting both that every grammatically correct sentence is a proposition and that every proposition must be true or false. But the sentence "This sentence is false" does seem to me to be grammatically correct. What am I missing?

好点! !这个句子是错误的。’似乎在语法上是正确的，但如果我们把它当作一个命题来表达，我们就会遇到问题，因为如果‘这个句子是错误的。'为真，则为假，如果为假，则(只给出两个真值)它一定为真。一个悖论!
我们有两种选择。我们要么咬紧牙关，承认‘这句话是错的。’表达了一个命题，包含了命题所带来的所有问题。或者我们可以拒绝‘这个句子是错误的’。“语法不正确，所以不能表达一个命题。但这也带来了问题，因为它导致了一个问题，我们基于什么来拒绝它?在句法基础上?但是语法上是正确的。在语义的基础上?但是如果我们要在这里引入语义区别，为什么我们不能对“真相很重要”这句话做同样的事情呢?或者其他句子?
我认为最合理的解决方案是我们拒绝“这个句子是错误的”。的语法错误。这句话与“真理很重要”的区别是什么?'就是，如果我们承认'这个句子是错误的。’作为一个语法句子，我们违反了排除中间原则，即没有一个命题是既真又假的。如果我们承认“真相很重要”，我们就不会违反排除中间。，语法正确。
这不是一件小事。就我个人而言，我很愿意考虑那些不违反排除中间值的可能性，但我不愿意对那些违反排除中间值的可能性这样做。所以我可以接受‘真相很重要’。，而不是“这个句子是错误的”。我想大多数人都有同样的遭遇。
注意，当我们考虑其他类型的句子时，也会出现类似的问题。“我是男性。只有当大约一半的人说这句话时才是正确的。所以‘我是男性’怎么可能。表达一个命题?“我笑了。’在我使用它的时候，有时是正确的，其他时候是错误的。这些问题将我们带入语言哲学的领域，这可能会变得非常复杂。
一般来说，我们用句子来表达断言命题的语句。我们用速记的方式谈论表达命题的句子，但这是处理语言的形式特性时的标准假设，在这种情况下，我们通常假设没有模棱两可的句子。(这个假设不是问题，因为它可以在任何时候被搁置。)命题本身是有意的对象，这意味着我们无法直接感知它们。我们只有通过符号化地表示一个命题才能得到它的结构。我们可以用句子的形式绘制命题图，但我们永远无法看到、听到、触摸、品尝或闻到命题本身。然而，我们知道命题的存在是因为我们根据它们来思考。这种情况意味着我们被困在使用语言来检查命题的结构上，伴随着所有的困难。

Well then, to me, I guess "Truth matters" is not a
“完全命题”，但我们可能把讨论的焦点转移到排除中间是或不是一个“语法”规则上。
回到(我希望)Ken在他最初的帖子中所说的观点，我认为他更强调的是(或不是)避免谎言的需要，而不是在每一个真实的陈述中寻找价值。有时候，事情的真相真的不重要，或者最好不被人知道，但也许有一个更有力的例子来证明“谎言重要”的论点。即相信或断言明显错误的东西几乎总是错误的。(如果我们局限于“可证明”的情况，即对应与惯例相一致，那么，适用于真理的具体理论可能就不那么相关了。)
So the question becomes under what circumstances may a falsehood not be a bad thing.
“萨达姆拥有大规模杀伤性武器”(用来激励士兵产生目标感，这可能会提高他们的效率)这种“有用的谎言”的价值发现，与真理或谬误的任何特定属性无关。这只是“目的vs.手段”问题的另一个例子，或许类似于一些人在常见的道德实践中使用的净效用论证，即决定是否将某人推下桥，以阻止一列火车行驶，否则火车会碾过站在轨道上的几个人。对一些人来说，为了最终的好结果而做错事永远是不合理的，但许多人接受净效用论。例如，我们中的许多人不会为了防止火车碾过孩子而把胖子推下桥，但出于对更大的利益的考虑，他们会定期并自愿地支持一些轻微的不公正行为(例如，不完全公平的税法，更公平的替代方案的管理成本会更高)。但即使是这些人也可能会同意，这种小小的不公正“本身”就是错误的，如果可以通过其他方式获得同样的普遍利益，就应该避免。同样，“有用的谬误”的可能净价值并不与这样一个事实相矛盾:推广这种谬误(“在道德上”)本身就是错误的。但无论如何，正如我在这段开头所说的，这个问题的这一方面与真理本身的特殊问题无关。
So my question is: Is there more to the idea of "serviceable falsehood" than this?
Scientific theories are often described as serviceable falsehoods which we accept for lack of a better alternative. This is what I believe Ken was getting at, although his reference to "approximate truth" may have led some of us astray. One view of a scientific theory is as something which claims only to compactly "predict" the results of all past observations (at least to within the accuracy range with which those observations were made). As such, if successful, the theory is true so long as its predictions all fall within the error bounds of the corresponding observed measurements. But when the theory is used to predict future observations, then it runs the risk of being falsified - as all theories will be (at least for so long as science continues to be worth doing). But "falsification" of a theory doesn't always make it false. Often, as in the case of Newtonian mechanics, it just puts restrictions on that theory's domain of validity.
这里有一个重要的区别(许多非科学家似乎无法理解)，那就是科学“理论”的两个完全不同的概念之间的区别。其一，就像牛顿力学或它的各种相对论和量子理论，是一组与各种观测值相关的规则(通常用数学公式表达)，另一个是用第一种更高层次的理论对某些现象的解释。热力学的统计力学解释是后者的一个例子，就像所有天文学或生物进化理论一样。
在后一种情况下(所谓的“理论”，其目的是为了解释某些观察结果)，对于科学家来说，“真相”实际上是有争议的，而且“很重要”(不管其他人是否真的在乎)。对于太阳系如何起源的问题，真正的答案只有一个，大多数科学家希望最终我们能找到足够的证据来证实这样一个理论。这同样适用于关于当前物种进化的某些步骤是如何发生的各种问题，但是，如果一个人认为不可能找到一条从非生命到当前情况的纯机械路径，那他就是一个完全的白痴，但肯定有一些情况下，我们还不知道哪个“理论”是正确的。是的，对我们这些在乎的人来说，这很重要。(我不知道亚历山大·基思(Alexander Keith)的淡啤酒(Pale Ale)是否在美国做过广告，但广告语是“喜欢它的人非常喜欢它”，或许情况也类似。)
然而，错误的行星或生物进化理论并不是“有用的谬误”。作为事件的历史，它完全是错误的，而且最终会发现它与某些观察到的事实在很大程度上是不符合实验误差的范围的(甚至可能不符合该理论提出时科学测量能力的任何有限的范围)。
Another kind of "serviceable falsehood" is promoted by some "enlightened" religious leaders. The thesis seems to be that the literal truth (or more probably untruth) of their scriptures does not matter because of some "deeper" meaning that belief in them is deemed to facilitate. This is of course, like every other religious doctrine in human history, a total pile of unholy evil crap. (I have a truly marvelous proof of this proposition which this blog comment is unfortunately too brief to contain.)

I think the significant question is, can we get the benefit of knowledge without actually possessing knowledge? Or is there some benefit we get from knowledge, that we can only get from knowledge? This I think is the gist of the problem Ken posed. For, if we can get the benefit of knowledge without actually possessing knowledge, then perhaps our belief about the value of knowledge is mistaken.
I believe there is value that we get from knowledge, and that we can only get from knowledge.
If we know a proposition is true, then we have good reason to believe any proposition entailed by that proposition -- and it will also be true. If I know that the cat is on the mat and that all cats are animals, then I have good reason to believe that an animal is on the mat -- and furthermore it will be true that an animal is on the mat.
No other kind of belief does this. Belief that is merely true gives no good reason to believe anything; while belief for which we have good reason, but that isn't true, might give good reason to believe something, but without any guarantee that this something is actually true. It's only when we have both good reason and truth that we have the unique benefit conferred by genuine knowledge.
Those who disagree are in the position of having to find some counterexample, some belief that does not constitute knowledge, but that nonetheless does give good reason for believing any logical consequence of the belief -- and guarantees that it will be true. I don't think this is possible. I'd like to hear of any examples that anyone comes up with. I don't think they exist. I hereby throw down the gauntlet and set the challenge for someone to come up with a counterexample!

I made it to Albuquerque and have found some time to return to this discussion.
Paul Hollander above offers the criticism that my phrases "what actually happens" and "someone really believes something" are inconsistent with the position that truth is defined by desire. There is no inconsistency. The identity of "what actually happens" is determined by one's experiences and that is all that is known. "Someone really believes something" says just what it says and nothing more. One believes what one believes. That one believes or knows something does not mean one knows anything about anything else.
(Relative to his criticism he suggests I abandon my position "in the interest of consistency". I'm sure abandonment would please him in any eventuality but I'm hardly going to throw out a beautiful baby in pristine water just so he can populate the earth with his own flawed progeny.)
(保罗，我甚至不能说你的努力是可信的。但是，从道德的角度出发，我要承认“实际发生的事情”是用词上的误导，尽管如此，从根本上说，这与我的立场并不矛盾。可能存在，也可能不存在独立的实体。人们会有这样的印象，他们的存在有各种各样的原因。但它们可能并不存在。如果它们确实存在，人们就无法独立于自己的经验来验证它们的存在。即使它们确实存在，它们也无关紧要，除非它们的经验能力。)
Going back to the last two "tests" he proposes above which I did not have time to address earlier, both the "normative" and "prescriptive" considerations are readily dismissed in that desire understood as the foundation of truth obviously and easily accounts not only for what one views as good/bad and right/wrong but also true/false.
我们又回到了原点。一个人所经历的是他所经历的，对独立的或客观的实体或经历的原因没有其他知识。在经验的背景下，欲望的状态决定了什么被认为是真的或假的。没有人说过任何实质性的话来改变这种看法。

One more point. In the above post I talk about the relation between truth and knowledge. Knowledge entails truth.
但事实并非如此:真理并不意味着知识。
Some might claim that if we don't or can't know that a proposition is true, then that proposition is not, in fact, true. This is what happens when truth gets defined as "warranted assertability" or some such thing. Is 'God exists.' true? No. Is 'God exists.' false? No. 'God exists.' acquires a third value, neither true nor false, because we are never warranted in asserting either that God exists or that God does not exist.
This presents difficulty.
Consider a legal system in which not only the plaintiff must prove she knows the charge to be true, but also the defendant must prove she knows the charge to be false, in order to win the case. If neither side can do this, then the case never gets resolved. Plaintiffs have the advantage because the mere leveling of a charge -- especially one that can't possibly be resolved -- can place a defendant in legal limbo literally forever.
This might sound to some like an accurate description of our situation. But think about it. Our president makes outrageous claims. If there really were three truth values, and if a proposition really were true only if we knew it was true, then we would be at a severe disadvantage when disputing the president's outrageous claims.
就像上面例子中倒霉的被告一样，为了解决问题，我们必须证明我们知道总统令人发指的说法是错误的。也许我们不能那样做。也许我们所能做的最好的就是对总统离谱的说法的真实性提出质疑，而不是证明我们知道它们是假的。如果是这样，那么我们就陷入了困境。总统可以一次又一次地提出离谱的索赔要求，在每种情况下，我们都必须证明我们知道离谱的索赔是错误的，以便解决问题。显然，那些提出离谱要求的人有优势，而那些对其他人的离谱要求表示怀疑的人显然处于劣势。
Is this the kind of world we want? Not me. It places the vast majority of us at the mercy of a powerful few, ensuring that the strong, who can shout the loudest and have the most to gain from outrageous claims, will do what they can and the weak, the rest of us, will suffer what we must.
就我自己而言，我更喜欢一个更公平的真理概念。要做到这一点，唯一的办法就是让真理独立于知识之外。有些真相我们不知道，也永远不可能知道。它们的存在。如果它们不存在，我们的处境确实会非常严重。

我不确定你是否理解我的批评。
The claim that truth is a consequence of subjective desire has been criticized for erroneously relativizing truth: what's true is only ever true for me, or true for you, or true for whomever; there is no truth independent of being true for someone. As I have already pointed out, this eliminates the possibility of genuine disagreement. We can't ever disagree without truth that applies equally to you and to me. You deny that genuine disagreement exists because you claim truth is relative to each person. This places you in the onerous position of having to convince us that disagreement is merely illusory. At this point, who looks more ridiculous, you or me? You're the one denying that disagreement (or agreement, for that matter) is real!
You also deny that you're contradicting yourself when you are caught red-handed. You claim that truth is relative and subjective, and yet at certain key points you claim that truth is not relative, not subjective, because you wish to talk about reality, and about what really happens. Well, which is it? Is truth relative and subjective, or isn't it?
So not only do you deny something that this very discussion proves is true -- that disagreement is real -- but you blatantly contradict yourself while you are doing it, and then deny that as well!
As if this weren't enough, ses, you also prevaricate about the nature of your claim. Sometimes you talk about what's true; other times you talk about what is considered to be true. When you wish to capitalize on the objective nature of truth, you talk about what's true. But when you wish to emphasize the alleged subjective nature of truth, you talk about what's considered to be true. Well, which is it? Are we talking about what's true, or are we talking about what's considered to be true? These are not the same thing.
再说一遍，我不清楚自己在这方面多写点东西是否有帮助。我推荐你们去看Theaetetus和形而上学书籍Gamma。也许柏拉图和亚里士多德会给你提供一个更有趣的对手。
当然，这一切都可以在一瞬间解决，只要问一个关键问题:他说的是真话吗?想想……

我又没时间了。我希望以下是明确的。目前这已经足够了。
保罗，在我看来，一切都很简单。人有足够的信念才会相信，有足够的欲望才会行动。事情就是这样完成的。一个人并不需要绝对的真理来让它发生。我确实认为，现实是没有什么是绝对可以证明的，一切都是明显的权力斗争。在个人内部和人际层面上的欲望的相互作用(如果任何其他有意识的存在真的存在的话)。
And having at one's disposition "absolute truth" gets one nowhere because then the other side just claims it has absolute truth. And the fact is --and this is important and supports my whole position -- if I really believe or feel that what I believe is absolute truth then it functions as such for me no matter what "reality" is. We just don't really know what's going on as far as I'm concerned.
“我思故我在”=“从我的观点来看，我所经历的构成了实相。就我所知，这是真的。我没有任何其他存在或现实的经验或知识”——以及主观评估“和/但这是一个总体上非常不令人满意的情况”!
We do agree the "President" makes outrageous decisions. Things are in a really sorry state and we may be headed for very dark days owing to really national incompetence. Not that I blame anyone. I don't "believe" in blame as such.

Paul my last post does not address your last post it was written beforehand. I'm out of time for today. I already addressed the issue of disagreement above read it again. Truth is a function of what matters to the conscious entity in question. What matters to the entity in question depends on the desires of that entity.

I get the feeling that, because I hold a desire-independent view of truth, somehow I'm getting accused of being a dogmatic absolutist.
哪个更民主?相信我们总能诉诸于一种独立于价值观、利益、欲望、权力等等之外的真理概念?还是否认这种信仰?
We who advocate independent truth are in favor of the right to question anything, free of restraints about what's in anybody's interest, what conforms with anybody's desire, what serves anybody's values, etc. This seems to me to be a basic human right. Certainly Socrates would have approved! It would be a shame if the Truth Police confiscated it.
Unfortunately, whether they realize it or not, the peddlers of truth-as-a-consequence-of-_____ (fill in the blank -- desire, values, whatever) are opposed to this fundamental right, because for them there is no independent truth, only truth relative to _____. On their account, we are never free to consider truth independently of _____, and it's just plain wrong to believe we can.
我再问一次，哪个更民主?不受限制地质疑我们的基本人权?还是说_____是所有真相的最终决定因素，而不管其他人怎么说?
You be the judge.
但是快点，在真相警察剥夺你自由决定_____的权利之前!

If you're questioning everything you're not asserting the existence of independent truth. If you're asserting the existence of independent truth you're not questioning everything.
断言绝对真理的存在显然是一种强迫，正如断言所谓真理可以理解为派生一样。而该公司保持相对于前一说法的信心则大大降低。
断言实际上是绝对的真理显然是什么都不质疑。就是不赋予任何人任何权利。
To assert the existence of absolute truth that is totally inaccessible is pointless.
The Thought Police have arrived but they're not making any sense.

ses, your error, other than trying to use elaborate grammar to try to give your assertion weight, is that you ignore or are unaware that the purpose of LIFE is to LIVE. (Supersets trump subsets in this, thus the individual's purpose is to propel the organism, whose purpose is to propel life itself (not all life).)
Paul is correct in that the de facto rulers, of the empire we reside in, know that if they trick us to think that truth is relative, always based upon some variable, then they can control the truth. They only have to choose variables that they believe they can control and have no chance for us to effect (ie: ""terrorism"").

为什么我们需要知道真相?
我吗?“真理会让我们自由”这句话我听过很多次了。这听起来很像圣经。