The Willing Suspension of Disbelief
Oct 18, 2005Why don't we run out of the movie theatre when a monster shows on the screen? What kind of mental state is the willing suspension of disbelief?
What can we learn from studying philosophy? What can we learn from reading great (or not-so-great) literature? Some philosophers and literary theorists believe that philosophy and literature converge in a number of places. Great literature is often deeply philosophical, and great philosophy is often great literature, sometimes in the form of fictional narrative. Perhaps we can learn many of the same lessons from philosophy and literature. Can the methods of philosophy and literary criticism be combined? Are the truths they shed light upon complementary? John and Ken are joined by fellow Stanford philosophy professor Lanier Anderson to discuss the intersection of philosophy and literature.
来自路易斯安那州什里夫波特百年学院KSCL工作室的John和Ken加入了节目,讨论了一个令人困惑的情况:哲学和文学似乎是不同的。哲学围绕着真理、智力和文字的使用,而文学则专注于虚构、情感和隐喻语言。因此,哲学从不像某些文学那样让我们感动得流泪。然而,一些最近的文学理论家和哲学家认为,哲学和文学并没有那么大的不同,两者都可以用相同的文本来例证。该节目的嘉宾拉尼尔·安德森(Lanier Anderson)就是其中之一。他是斯坦福大学哲学系的教授,也是该校哲学与文学思想项目的共同创始人,该项目旨在打破与文学和哲学研究相关的学术学科之间的界限。
The show has three segments. The first concerns how philosophy can be done through literature. Paradigms of this feat are Plato's dialogues, Borges's short story "Pierre Menard, Autór del Quixote" investigating the notion of authorship, and Camus's novel The Plague investigating the notion of freedom. Anderson thinks there are distinctively literary methods for pursuing philosophy, which these implement. Via such methods, sometimes one makes more progress in a philosophical investigation than one could by approaching the investigation "straightforwardly". (The hosts and guests agree that here the 'sometimes' is an important qualification; literary methods are not in general superior to standard philosophical ones when it comes to answering tough questions.) One such method involves eliciting emotional reactions from the reader in order to inspire new philosophical insights. Another exploits that no fictional character need be the "mouthpiece" of the author: In such situations, when characters express different views, readers must reckon for themselves who is right.
The second segment concerns what philosophers have said about literature. Some have wondered whether we can learn truths about the real world by reading fiction. Ken is skeptical about this: Since laws of nature can be broken at will in fictional worlds, they would seem an unreliable source of information about the real world, which always obeys those laws. Other philosophers have wondered whether investigating how literature conveys messages and morals can help us understand the pragmatics of natural language. Does literature show truths, rather than say them? Third, some philosophers have pondered the notion of narrativity. For example, Sartre's Nausea suggests that having narrative structure in one's life is essential for developing one's sense of self. This seems plausible to Anderson and Ken, though they disagree whether the "narrative impulse" is part of our biological programming or is rather a cultural norm that we try to live up to without having evolved to do so. Finally, for decades a topic of hot philosophical debate has been why readers react emotionally to stories they know to be fictional. Why do I cry for Anna Karenina, or despise Iago? Answering this question will help shape our philosophical theories of emotion, empathy, and imagination.
The third segment of the show concerns how philosophy can be literature. Some philosophers, like Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, write in a dramatic "aphoristic" style. Some great pieces of philosophy, like Plato's Symposium, are also great pieces of literature. Some great pieces of literature, like Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, are also great pieces of philosophy. But, for the most part, contemporary Anglophone philosophers use dry, pedantic prose. (John, who sometimes writes dialogues, is a rare exception.) The precise quality of their prose is suited for building detailed theories, but Anderson thinks a vaguer style is better for teasing out the new philosophical problems to which such theories respond.