跟我想的不一样。必须有误解。可能。他的工作没有包含规范等等吗?这就是所谓的参照理论吗?规范和参照，虽然不互相排斥，但似乎不包容，相反。无论如何，如果时间和机会允许，我将读这本书。

I read Meaning Diminished (MD) and will try, as well, to get this one done in time to feedback thoughtfully. Not sure I will get there. The world is starting again in ways that dictate my time whether I refer to it or not.

如果我对MD的理解是正确的，Ken对从语义学中确定形而上学不抱太大希望。这与最近的维也纳圈(Vienna Circle)、逻辑经验主义世界杯赛程2022赛程表欧洲区和蒙田(Montaigne)的递减效果非常吻合。我所知道的转化为世界。在肯看来，语言具有内在的、相对不同的作用和兴趣。在我的理解中，这个最小的视角还不够远，但我不需要测量太多的距离。如果引言和第一章都是正确的，那么引用世界是Ken的偏颇方法。让我读一下，看看还有什么要说的。我只是很遗憾不能听到他作为乔什和雷的客人为自己辩护。

There is a world. There is a brain. Just what the two can say or do to the other is a bit up for grabs. I hope this book will shed some light. Ken had his moments in PT productions where he drew the lines between the arguments. It’s nice to have these two final works where he is in the hot seat.

The positive ontological assertion with regards to brains and the world is non-controversial. That the relationship between them is "up for grabs", however, appears much less certain. If the world includes brains, then certainly brains constitute parts of the world, which latter is in turn governed by laws of nature discoverable in the context of the quantitative sciences. A similar issue came up In 1795 when the German anatomist Samuel T. Soemmerring claimed he had discovered a "sensorium commune," said to be a location in the human brain where all sensations flowed together to produce conscious experience. This was where the nerves seemed to concentrate in certain brain cavities, or "ventricles", and terminate in a liquid that filled the cavities, which the anatomist called "brain water" and today is called cerebrospinal fluid. He claimed to have found the location of the soul in the body, upon which the mind and all conscious self-identity depends. The philosopher Kant, quite famous by that time, wrote to Soemmerring that, while admiring his work, he could not accept that he had done what he had claimed, since the soul or mind, he pointed out, can perceive itself only through the inner sense of the combination of all the outer sensations; and to stipulate a place in space for it would therefore be to attempt to make itself an external object of its own sensation, in effect, to "posit itself outside of itself," which would be a contradiction. Could a similar objection be made here, with respect to what might be called a false dichotomy between brains and the world; in contrast to a genuine dichotomy between minds and brains, where the latter are described as constituent parts of the world?

So, please allow me to re-state my inquiry. More directly: Is referring to the world what Ken Taylor had in mind? It may be construed as such, I suppose. But that is mere supposition on my part. What do you take normativity to be? Please help me here. Or, review your understanding of what Professor Taylor intended.

还没听过这个节目，因为它将在稍后我所在的电台播出。Ken的作品还无法得到充分的评价，对他的欣赏也只能停留在最初的阶段。我记得泰勒教授很喜欢用“范畴错误”这个词，比如把一个范畴中的谓词，比如语法，应用到另一个范畴的主语上，比如数学:“几何是属格情况下的代数”;产生一个无意义的陈述，尽管听起来很容易理解。有一个故事，讲的是一个人的狗从来不叫，除非是对任何刺激做出反应。每当那人把钥匙弄得叮当响时，那只狗就叫起来。因为他和这只只会吠叫的狗一起生活了很多年，所以他得出了这样的结论，那就是钥匙的叮当声和狗的吠声实际上是一模一样的，这也成了他的一种习惯。通过一致性相关，这个人犯了推断数量同一性的范畴错误。为什么否认心灵独立于大脑，就不会在推断两者的同一性时犯同样的错误呢?