永远不要把某人当作手段，除非那意味着生孩子。康德是复杂的，他在那些本不应该逃避他思想的基本问题上大错特错。为什么会这样呢?我会等着卡伦•斯托尔(Karen Stohr)来签到，但理性不是道德进步的基础。

Further affiant sayeth not... as they say. ;-)

Well, probably not. Tolstoy liked to, hmm, shall we say, procreate at the level of children. And Kant enjoyed procreating at level of, shall we say, "Further affiant sayeth not," plus 1030 pages of reason (including end-matter). I really find Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments helpful. And quite frankly (although I anticipate a grunchy response), I think this distinction corresponds to one made by Tolstoy at the end of War and Peace, where he points out, with respect to power, how people always "arrive at such relations among themselves that the largest number of people take the largest direct part and the smallest number of people the smallest direct part in the joint action for which they have come together." (p. 1196, Richard Pevear trans.) The smallest number corresponds to society's elite analytic class (granddads and grandmums), and the largest part to society's workers (all the little kiddies). It also has a mathematical aspect with respect to time (elders, elites, small part-mind, and youth, non-elite many, larger part-body). Analytic truths (the elders who guide things) and synthetic truths (the youngsters who do the things). Between the one and the other is the trouble-maker class, the raucous satyr chorus and their their sweet-singing mermaid friends. The satyrs and the mermaids are so much fun when they get together. Weeee!

I'll bet Kant and Tolstoy would have very little to say to one another...That would be a very silent table...All beards and egos...

The use of language is called what it's called by the use of language, and thus contains a problem of self-reference similar to the use of pictures for the purpose of describing a visible object which exists. You haven't answered my question, though. With regards to a lie which one tells one's self, I didn't ask you whether or not you do it, I asked how it's done. Presumably, when you lie to yourself, you know you're lying. The lie proceeds without ever becoming established as successful. The question for Kant is of course contained in your second sentence from the end above: Could anyone consistently will self-lying to be a universal law in any given case of its performance? That seems to me highly untenable, as "telling the truth" to one's self seems a fundamental tenet with regards to the use of the categorical imperative as a law which the understanding of one's own freedom is supposed to give to itself. Your theory that the use of language equates to self-lying is therefore highly spurious if with it you're trying to critically approach Kant's ethical position. Such a recommendation is subject to the same objection as lying to another, or "successful lying": The institution of trust and promising would be undermined, to the point where human existence would become unsustainable. In the self-lying variant which you suggest, the ability to trust one's self would be similarly eroded, to the point where one could no longer conceive of any long term plans. It's the ability to make a promise to one's self which your suggestion would undermine, and could conceivably be an explanatory factor in some of the undesirable situations previously expressed by the self-liar in this case, which might otherwise have been avoidable.

我很确定这不是他的把戏。对康德来说，快乐不是推销他的哲学的一种方式，而是他职业工作中显著而持久的兴趣。以第二批判(A204/205)中介绍的实践理性的二律背反为例。在本书的第一部分确定了常识道德的理性基础后，康德声称已经证明，由于美德不能与快乐等同(因此责任也不能与快乐等同)，它必须被正确地描述为值得快乐(因此也值得快乐)。康德认为，对个人而言，“最高的善”是将两者结合在一起，从而确定了一个由两部分组成的概念:一部分是基于作为行为价值的义务(美德)，另一部分是指作为理想结果或具体关联的快乐或一种特殊的快乐(幸福)。

Clearly, then, the topic of pleasure is central in Kant's non-peripheral discussion here. But the next step in his argument is notable, and directly relates to your second sentence above: How are these two parts of the concept related? In the ancient world the Epicurean view, according to Kant, was to identify virtue as whatever leads to happiness, and duty therefore as whatever leads to pleasure, (at least the kind of pleasure which is generated by doing one's duty). The Stoics on the other hand saw virtue as happiness itself. Duty as its own reward doesn't need any further pleasure which completes it beyond its own performance. Without going into the details of the Antinomy itself (which has the Stoics coming out on top with the reservation that their position is only true on condition that the pleasure of duty isn't part of the motive for doing it, but at most an accidental result-- A206/207), I think it's clear how fundamental pleasure is, described as an essential component of the highest good for an individual, in Kant's moral theory. My question for the proponent of this theory, however, is: How are the motive grounds of duty independent from the anticipated subjective effect of doing it? Here I would agree with your first sentence above: His detectable answer to that question remains singularly unconvincing.