Prudent and not distributive? How could such a sincere request from an illustrious and valued colleague be denied by anything other than the rash heedlessness of a drowsy moment in the study-parlor of this inchoate greenhorn? There remains of course, as you're well aware, an alternative for this collegiate solicitation: you could just look it up. But as I see it, the principle of double effect is either a way to get out of getting blamed for something you did but didn't intend, or a way of taking credit for doing something good which looks really bad. Kant offers a good example of the latter variety in the Critique of Practical Reason at A107 in which someone who deliberately annoys others while relishing their displeasure is beaten (mit einer tuechtigen Tracht Schlaege abgefertigt), and compares it with a surgical operation. The beating, as with subcutaneous trauma of surgery, is in itself bad but its result is judged as good, and therefore the negative result is morally permissible on grounds of the good one. Examples of the former variety are also easy to find, as for instance the case of a suitor who intends to propose marriage after dinner in a restaurant by placing an engagement ring in a slice of chocolate mousse as a surprise and before he can get the question out she eats it and is hospitalized, which is bad, but the proposal is nevertheless accepted, which is good, so he doesn't get blamed for almost killing her. Note that the mistake is not an innocent one, as it was an exceptionally unwise plan. The ascribable value of the institution of marriage, however, overrides any condemnation of how it began. And there are other versions. But it's the first one (with Kant's example) which seems to my mind the most pertinent to your remarks. So with regards to their double-effect, might there be any positive result of the actions producing the conditions you describe above which, although they are bad in themselves, would furnish their moral permissibility on account of some positive effect which they in addition produce?

这难道不是阿伦特的分析所反对的吗?她是不是在某个地方指出，极权主义运动不同于民族主义政治运动(比如法西斯主义)，因为它不需要公众的支持，而只需要大量孤立的个人?虽然我相信你的决定在策略上是合理的，但从表面上看，它与社会健康的建议不符，这可能是阿伦特治疗的衍生品。

阿伦特与海德格尔的关系是有争议的，关于她的成熟作品保留了多少他的影响。但我认为，可以肯定的是，这种影响是双向的:阿伦特在风格和方式上受到了影响，海德格尔认为社会孤立的概念是对社会纠缠的假装否认。由于后者在他的《存在与时间》(如上所述)一书中作为一个主要主题出现，有一些可信的理由相信阿伦特是这本书的部分合著者。(传记注:h主动提出和a建立关系，并在课堂上在a的桌子上放了一张纸条，邀请她去他的办公室讨论材料;你对苏格拉底婚姻忠诚的信心是少数人的观点)。

Although it's unknown if Arendt was enrolled in Heidegger's seminar on the Sophist, it's very probable that she was, and therefore it's in this respect, what she received and developed into her later work from this period, that the passage cited above becomes significant. The Sophist for Plato is someone who pretends to be they're not. As producers of mere appearances, or "semblence-makers" (eidolopoiikoi), they've made a career out of things which are not true, including themselves. Plato at this time is also dealing with a severe and crippling challenge to his theory of forms from which, according to his lecture notes, Heidegger believed was headed up by Plato's rebel-student named Aristotle, (the so-called "third man" argument which appears in the Parmenides, and written into the Sophist as the "Giantomachy"). This is apparently very threatening to Plato, as the success of such a challenge would "destroy the possibility of common discourse" (Parmenides 135c); which further indicates that the sophist, as a committed producer of false appearances, erodes the common ability to trust as true anything about other people, so that the sophist's success would mean the destruction of society.

Here's where the passage comes in. Plato has a solution in his ideal state for the possibility of that eventuality: Simply arrest them. "To seize him (sullabein auton) according to instructions from the king's argument (kata ta epestalmena hupo tou basilikou logou) and, handing him over (paradontas), to proclaim the manhunt's success (apophaenai taen agraen)". So what argument is it that is referred to as authorizing such action? Since Plato is not explicit about it in the text, one can surmise that it's his theory of forms, uninstantiated universals called "ideas", prominent among which is the idea of freedom which controls the truth of people as real, and not mere appearances. Because no one can in truth deny their own freedom, to make a career out of pretending to be a mere appearance corresponds in aggregate to an unfree society, or tyranny. But that sounds very similar to Arendt's view that involves totalitarian movements as elevating the small, anonymous person to the appearance of threatening the established powerful one. This is where the individual uninterested in civil participation and is hidden "under a rock", in your terminology, is seen in aggregate to ruffle the feathers of the powerful and equates to a surrender of one's own freedom, as though such a thing would be possible, in unconscious exchange for the totalitarian movement's leadership elements to "do the acting for you", so to speak, as a surrogate voluntariness of agency. Well then, couldn't Plato's idea to arrest sophists in order to keep society together resemble a similar tactic based on Arendt's analysis to arrest leaders of totalitarian movements? While such a recommendation would be inadvisable according to current legal standards, it may offer insight into the precise nature of Heidegger's influence of Arendt.