--Consider them with regards to whether or not excess and deficiency of explanatory power of a model's correspondence to its object are related to one another in some discernible way or ways in given cases, I presume. Your first sentence above seems to assert that they're not, but how that's supposed to be "good enough" is, to this participant anyway, itself a mystery. Take your example of reading the correct time on a clock whose hands don't move. The model consists in a correspondence-claim between the measurement-apparatus (the clock) and its object (day-time and night-time = relative positions of earth and sun). Here the judgement of the clock's accuracy is based on the assumption that its hands are moving, and the refutation of that judgement is based on the fact that they're not. As a remedy for that deficiency a sundial could be recommended, which functions without having to assume that it moves. Now, is the same object measured in each case, or does the removal of "night-time" from the latter make them different objects altogether? The answer of course is no. The object is the same, but the sundial is deficient half of the time, whereas the clock is only deficient when the tool of measurement malfunctions. So here there's clearly a relation between kinds of measurement, which could also be called "models", insofar as definite explanatory claims made about a corresponding object, because it's the same object in each case.

But take an example much closer to the point. The surrealist painter Salvador Dali in 1944 painted a picture entitled "Dream caused by the Flight of a Bee around a Pomegranate a Second Before Awakening". The title makes a causal claim: the bee's flight around a piece of fruit, which is based on Freud's theory that images remembered as occurring in dreams are private symbols of repressed memories. Contemporary views, however, contradict such an interpretation and instead attribute such images to prior experiences reproduced in non-rational form on account of a surplus of electro-chemical activity in the brain during sleep. Here there is no relation between the two models, because they're not talking about the same object. Dali's version concerns specific dream-contents, whereas the cognitive science model focuses on a generic cause of all such contents, or rather, in the old terminology, a dream's form.

到目前为止，在上述讨论中提出的关于量子纠缠的例子中的模型缺陷和关于万有引力的模型过剩之间的比较中，有人能说这只是内容的问题吗?前者是无法解释的，后者是形式的明确性。在彻底否定二分法之前，有必要问一下，在这种情况下，是否考虑了两个不同的对象，即在另一个版本中，“很小”和“很大”，或“强力”和“弱力”。难道我们不能断言，这里的共同对象是作为一个整体的“自然”，在原则上，在某一时刻通过合法联系的规律性而统一起来吗?如果不同模型的解释能力的过剩和不足通常彼此之间没有关系，这难道不等于说自然不存在吗?