Loyalty is usually reckoned to be an important virtue; even loyalty to lost causes is often admired. But loyalty to evil causes is no virtue. To whom and what should one be loyal? When is loyalty a virtue? When is it wrong? And when is it stupid? Ken and John welcome back poet and philosopher Troy Jollimore, author ofFriendship and Agent-Relative Morality.
Ken and John begin by exploring what the concept of loyalty means. They first notice that it’s a uniting force in friendships, marriage, and the bond between citizens and country. However, Ken points out that loyalty also divides. For example, soldiers fight and kill other soldiers in the name of loyalty. John notes that with a utilitarian view, where one acts towards the greatest good for the greatest number, it’s hard to make sense of loyalty at all. John poses a hypothetical to Ken: if his wife and a Nobel laureate were drowning, and he could only save one, why give special treatment to his wife strictly based on loyalty? Ken feels that something is wrong with this picture, but John pushes his case. What if Ken could save two people instead of his wife? Or three? Or the whole contingent of Nobel laureates from that year? There seems to be a point where loyalty can go too far.
Troy Jollimore加入了谈话。肯首先问，为什么忠诚在美好的生活中占据如此重要的地位?特洛伊描述了哲学家若泽·罗伊斯的思想，他写道，忠诚通过决定一个人是谁，什么对他们来说是重要的，并赋予他们目标，从而塑造了人类的生活。肯认为，有人可能只忠于抽象的事物，如真和美，但特洛伊反驳说，这种可能性并不包含太多内容。人的能力是有限的，所以个人必须挑选自己忠诚的特定对象。
下一节，肯，约翰和特洛伊在思考什么让忠诚在某些情况下合适而在另一些情况下不合适。特洛伊说，对一个国家的忠诚没有多大意义。你要么有很好的客观理由来忠诚，在这种情况下，进一步的忠诚理由是不必要的，要么你没有很好的客观理由，在这种情况下忠诚就不应该有可信度。当肯注意到同样的困惑可以转移到个案中时，特洛伊重申个人关系中的忠诚是不同的，因为它有助于塑造一个人的身份和生活方向。我们的主人和客人得出的结论是，决定性的、更大的忠诚最好是取消，但个人的忠诚不应该取消。一个完全没有忠诚的人将会过着一种缩水的生活。
To sum up the discussion, Troy reiterates that loyalty helps constitute identity but is also dangerous and not something we should take lightly or rush into. John adds that loyalties seem a bit like vices. They are unavoidable, but we should be careful of the ones we take on.
