Arecent Radiolab podcastrelates an amazing story about Allen Funt, the creator of the television show, Candid Camera. Funt found himself on a plane that was being hijacked. However, as Funt was by then well-known as the creator of the show, one of the passengers on the hijacked plane spotted Funt, started to grin and, pointing at Funt, yelled out, “we’re on Candid Camera!” The rest of the people on the plane began to recognize Funt as well and,despite Funt’s protestations to the contrary他开始相信这次劫机完全是一个精心策划的骗局——一场表演。但这并不是一场表演，当所有人在古巴(劫机者的目的地)下飞机时，每个乘客在下飞机时都对方特说了一些精选的话。

艾伦·方特所处的处境是这样的:由于他模糊了“现实”和“表演”之间的界限，人们无法理解这种处境到底是什么。就像《狼来了》一样，方特无法让飞机上的乘客相信这不是一场秀，因为人们已经开始期待，无论何时在现实生活中看到他，这真的只是一场秀。在播客中，Radiolab做了一个有趣的观察:随着我们与他人的关系越来越多地通过社交媒体互动来调节，我们今天所处的位置可能比Funt在那决定性的一天所处的位置更复杂。作为我们现在所称的“真人秀电视”的先驱，方特意识到，当人们认为世界可能在观看时，他们的行为与我们认为世界没有在观看时的行为是非常不同的。这也许是显而易见的。我们(也就是那些使用社交媒体的人)是否太过沉迷于“展示”，以至于“现实”和“展示”之间的区别变得模糊，以至于我们在获取彼此的知识时产生了根本性的新的认知问题，这一点并不明显，但却非常值得思考。这就是我在听Radiolab播客时的想法:也许社交媒体创造了一种新的认知问题。

Here is one way of thinking about this epistemic problem. One way of conceptualizing knowledge is in terms of our ability to rule out “relevant alternatives.” For example, to use Fred Dretske’s example, in order for me to know that the animal at the zoo is a zebra, I must be able to rule out that it is a cleverly painted mule. Since it seems that I can rule this out, I do indeed know that it is a zebra, not a mule (assuming there aren’t other relevant alternatives that I can’t rule out). Now consider a pre-Funt era when my friend tells me that p. If I can rule out that she is lying then it looks like I know that she believes p. Contrast this with a situation in which my friend posts on Twitter that p (or posts a picture of herself doing x on Instagram). I still have to rule out that she is lying, but now it seems that there are other alternatives to rule out as well. For example, to what extent is she saying this because other people are watching? Would she say this if others weren’t watching? Is she just saying it for “show,” because she wants her words to have a certain effect on her Twitter followers—e.g., to make them think a certain way of her? That is a relevant alternative that is different from lying, but that needs to be ruled out if I am really supposed to take this as a candid revelation of herself. In short, whereas in a pre-Funt era I needed to rule out just one (to simplify) relevant alternatives regarding candid interactions with others (i.e., lying), in an era of social media ubiquity, I have to rule out two: lying and “show.”

Perhaps another word for “show” here is “performance.” In a world in which personal cameras + social media are ubiquitous, the distinction between “the candid” and “performance,” may be much fuzzier than in a pre-Funt world. The idea of what I have called performance or show can be connected to what Harry Frankfurt has called “bullshit.” According to Frankfurt, “bullshit” is a kind of speech that is not concerned with truth but, rather, with the effects one’s words have on others. The bullshitter cares less about truth than the liar, according to Frankfurt. Would there be more bullshit in a world in which social media interactions are ubiquitous than in a pre-Funt world? I don’t know, but it is interesting to consider (which, however, I will not do at any further length in this post).

So, to summarize, the epistemic problem connected to social media that I am suggesting here is this. People’s apparently candid interactions with each other via social media (like Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, etc.) cannot be straightforwardly taken to be candid unless we can rule out the effects of “show.” Since we are concerned with what others think of us, what is communicated through such venues cannot be assumed to be free of “show” or “performance.” The result is that it is harder to know who a person really is, insofar as our interactions with them are mediated through social media. Perhaps the “show” effects of social media interactions also affect our non-social media, face-to-face interactions. And perhaps they make not only our knowledge of others difficult, but also our knowledge of ourselves. I am not convinced that any of this is true, but it is interesting to consider whether (or to what extent) it is.