This is really meant for this morning (Jan 11) about history. In Western academy and media, I rarely, if never, hear about the post-colonial Non-Aligned Movement which met in Bandung, Indonesia attempting to avoid Cold War conflict paradigms. Instead, the U.S. "lost" China and Vietnam. The development needs of the majority of
the world's population, now including global climate change and trade, is finally occurring in the new paradigm and financial architectures to be raised in the
upcoming G20, which met in Beijing and Washington DC and is scheduled for April 2 in London.

As to "Who Lost China?", there was John Foster Dulles who did not shake hands with Zhou Enlai, Henry Luce of Time-Life Magazines who controlled his image of China to the American public, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the English-speaking, beautiful and Christian Soong Mei-ling,
as contrasted with one of her two famous sisters,
Soong Chingling who married Sun Yat-sen and truly loved
China. The American people and government would have
forged a better relationship much sooner than 30 years of Cuba and Iran-like estrangement, if they had listened to
the compassionate instincts and political judgements of Pearl Buck, Edgar Snow and Theodore White.

What bothers me is that the "fact" part of "history" is, relatively speaking, so small.
例如，广岛/长崎原子弹爆炸:所有左右历史学家都同意的是，美国投下了两颗炸弹。我们为什么这么做，我们是否必须这么做，等等。都是可以解释的。
Iraq? Yes, all agree that we invaded but everything else is up for grabs, again with a right/left split: yes, we had to; no, we didn't. Bush lied to us; no, he believed the intel. etc. (We don't even know how many Iraqis have died since we invaded.)
在今年的初选期间，我开始相信我生活在另一个世界里。(我支持希拉里，而不是奥巴马。)我读、看、听这些演讲。然后我看博客、杂志和报纸。不仅是解释，而且往往事实似乎是不同的。(我最终确实找到了一群与我看法相同的博主，但这仍然回避了一个问题:到底是哪一群人准确地记录了这次活动。)
If, with all the resources available to us today (radio, tv, papers, magazines, blogs, the Wiki, Google, etc., etc.), the sphere of unquestionable facts (bombs were dropped, we invaded, Obama won) is so small relative to the presentation or interpretation of those facts, then "history" becomes as much an artificial construct as economics (where, it turns out, left/right economists still argue about what caused the Depression).
How can we learn from the past, let alone the present, when we can't even agree on what the past/present was or is?

我希望购买2004-2008年2022世界杯小组赛分组哲学讲座播客的全部集合。中国伊朗亚洲杯比赛直播然而，我意识到这将花费我很长时间下载!您是否可以考虑收取额外的少量费用，以邮寄方式收集数据光盘?
Thanks! :)
- William.

On a past subject it turns out: ID proposes a preternatural, anthropomorphic accounting for selected natural events, i.e. something akin to human ability to consciously analyze and manipulate the physical world.
Science jolly well chooses to reject that notion out of hand for at least the reason that anything and everything can be so "explained". Would sort of take the fun and challenge out of being a scientist. Besides, such explanations inherently come up with dead end conclusions such as geocentric astronomy instead of functional orbital mechanics -- and 'heaven' knows what in biology.
It's like plastic apples versus real oranges. Plastic apples have their contrived appeal for some, but are certainly of no other value compared to actual oranges. Here again as everywhere, 'ya takes 'yer choices.

温和现实主义与康德现实主义有何不同?

谁在这个网站上回答问题?

Quibbles; "hardwired"? Does he mean, "comes with the DNA" or do we have a choice about this?
I would suggest, for starters, that information and action are separable mental functions in the sense that we can think of something to do without doing it, and we can do things without, consciously, thinking about them, though subconsciously we have a plan. What does Perry say about that?
在这方面，哲学上天真的“科学家”认为观察(经验主义)在某种程度上脱离了推理。但是，如果它们将一个对象标识为已经存在于内存中的类的成员，例如，“that is a....”，而此时它们说，“…chair”，这怎么可能呢?
They have reasoned by relating that sensed object to an existing substance in their mind, collected before and held as a set of accidents by which that object is distinguishable from "...", perhaps a "table."
因此，纯粹的经验主义是一种理性超脱的客观性的错觉。简而言之，寻找的目的在于控制我们在哪个类中识别感知对象。对象本身并没有跳出思维独立的现实而成为概念上的存在。
How about this, Mr. Perry?
他的更广泛的观点，即经验对我们所做的事情很重要，是有道理的，但“我们做对了重要吗?”意味着历史中从未存在过的一种最终版本或客观性。相反，存在的才是历史学家真正和最终的目的。历史学家从现在的事物中挑选出他认为代表过去事件的事物，然后编造出关于这些事件的观点。总之，没有所谓的“客观历史”。有一种“科学史”，它是对细节的内在确证，使过去事件的概率提高到较高的概率程度，但任何历史都不能取代不可见的、不存在的过去，仿佛“历史”就是过去本身。即使我们有时间机器，这是不可能的，因为过去已经不在那里，也无处可去，(安静，阿尔伯特!)我们在镜头里看到的仍然只是我们想看到的，这是我们看的直接目的。你这是在强调什么呢，佩里先生，还是另有所指?请建议。

The comment by D. Douglas on how difficult it is to get agreement about the past in histories about it is beside the point. It implies a kind of objectivity about the past that is neither possible nor useful.
相反，重要的是，历史学家观察和写作的目的在他的初步评论中是明确的，这样他的偏见就能被读者理解和仔细使用。
In short, there's nothing wrong with a bias. We all have them, but scientific history adequately identifies the historian's bias up front so that the reader knows all the way through from whence he cometh.
与之相反的是，把过去发生在某个时间和地点的每一件事都讲出来，这当然是荒谬的，也是没有用的。
All we have to do to be useful in the present is to sharply identify our biases, such as Evelyn Underhill does in her treatise on "Mysticism," -- told from four different biases -- and then strive mightily to be consistent throughout our reporting to it. Any criticism of a bylined news story or non-propaganda history is valid insofar as it points to inconsistency between the declared bias and its influence on the resulting exposition.
Enter quibbles here, please! LOL

I quite agree with J. Fuller above as he emphasizes the silliness of thinking that mind can create matter, or his technical jargon to that effect. However, it is well to point out emphatically, too, that this propensity, to think things are a whatever we think they are, i.e. radical subjectivism, more or less, is an effect of the rather widespread illusions that we cannot know things, ala Kantianism, as they are in themselves.
我们不能这样做，但这变得复杂得多:开门见山地说，我们不需要;我们所需要做的就是能够区分每一个被观察事物的实质，包括所有依赖于思维的事物，例如想法，和另一个事物，我们自动地做到这一点，因为思维的运作方式总是与依赖于思维的事物的运作方式不同。不同之处在于，事物有无数个可观察的方面，而每一个反映该事物的想法一次只能反映一个方面。而这种根本的差异似乎正是当前哲学困惑的所在。
这就是说，根据观察到的和记忆到的各阶层之间的关系，我们知道事物之间的差别或偶然性的集合作为每一事物的实质。知道这一点就是知道事物的本质，只要它对当前的目的有任何价值。如果没有目的，连贯性就会消失;包括它，逻辑上的一致性胜出。
In short, we do "know things as they are in themselves" but only insofar as they differ from all others, which is our only useful value. We do not and we cannot know anything in all its infinite number of possible aspects.
There is no mystery here, only an ethnic bias against anything smacking of Scholasticism or even Westernism. And that is the critical problem in modern philosophy, in my academic experience, namely the confusion between mind and body (matter). However, it is not a problem in the moderate realist's attitude toward how things are.