This is a response to Ken’s fascinating blog onnaturalism, Schopenhauer and value. I’m amenable to his naturalism. But I’m not sure I see the problem of value as a matter of getting something out of nothing.

It seems to me that values come out of valuing, and that valuing starts with an attitude we might call “caring whether.” As we look to the future, many facts seem unresolved. Will I eat tonight or go hungry? Will the Cardinals choose an Italian to be Pope, or a non-Italian? Will the White House support Tom Delay, or keep its distance? Will Camilla and Charles someday be Queen and King, or will they be passed by in favor of young William? Some of these things I care about. I care whether I eat tonight or go hungry. This is shown by the fact that I will exert some energy to assure that I get something to eat. If all else fails, I will actually get out of my comfortable chair and make myself something. Others of these things I care nothing about. If it were in my power to decide the British succession by getting out of my chair and going to the refrigerator, I wouldn’t do it. Even if I could decide the issue by raising my right or left hand, I wouldn’t spend the energy. And Tom Delay? Well, I would gladly lift a hand if it would lead the White House to abandon this irksome politician. But I don’t care enough to do much more than that.

As of now, the future consists of an infinity of open states of affairs, things that may happen, or may not happen: P or not-P, as philosophers like to say. A small minority of these are ones I care about. The thought of P rather than not-P makes me sad, fills me with dread, mildly upsets me, or whatever. It matters to me. And if I can contribute to bringing about P rather than not-P, I’ll expend some effort to do so.

This phenomenon, of caring, isn’t confined to humans, or even to mammals. It seems quite general throughout the animal kingdom, and it seems to extend a pattern that is found in everything alive. A bird cares whether it eats a worm or not; it will expend energy to get to the worm; it will be upset if some other bird snatches it away.

在思考关怀的时候，区分“自我”参与的两种不同方式是很重要的。一般来说，只有自己关心的事情才会影响自己的行为，这是真的。我的忧虑被储存在我的大脑里，因此对我的行为起着因果作用。但这并不意味着只有我才能成为我关心的对象。如果我想让你今晚吃点东西，我是欲望的主体，是欲望的拥有者，但你是客体，是我关心的东西。

This is where I would locate the phenomenon of value, in the objects that animals care about. Animals clearly care about their own welfare, but just as clearly some animals care about the welfare of their offspring. These objects have some value to them, because they care what happens to them, as shown by their emotional reactions to the fate of these things, and their willingness to invest energy to cause certain things to happen, and prevent other thing from happening.

Ken want to bring value in at the human level, in the characteristically human phenomenon of reflecting on our desires and identifying with some of them and rejecting others. That’s an important phenomenon, but I don’t believe it is where valuing, or values, originate.