The subjunctive takes its toll too, if we posit it as determinate as the mere restatement of antecedence. There is no difference between dogmatic modus ponens and tolens. One says that the derived term must be true if the antecedent is true, the other that the antecedent is true if the derived term is. Both are invalid logical assumptions. This, because attributes are not some third thing that gets attached somehow, arbitrarily or intrinsically. The attribute is a perceivable sense in which we are not the monad, and so intercede with each other as that sense in which each sufficiently withdraws from the "attribute" so the other can be seen as the model of it. But this is why there can be no god, as Leibniz so cleverly hid from us. Individuality is the participation that withdraws so that the "attribute" can be witnessed. Monadology, so necessary to the mechanical calculator, is the most destructive concept ever to be introduced into philosophy. It puts a hermetic seal between us that only, it is hoped, the god can resolve. Get rid of god and the problem of the hermetic individual dissipates like a morning mist. Newton has a much better claim to the calculus. It was him, after all, or before anyone else, and in an explosion of genius, who said A=dV/dT, when he could have found a more conventional means of calculating acceleration. There is just no comparison. So, I guess I'm with Voltaire.
Michael,
如果你喜欢《格列佛》(电影)，你可能会喜欢《老实人》(Candide)，尽管我觉得它的风格有点古怪。

Thanks, I'll check it out!
As for a perfect world, who are we to judge, God?
And as for me, I find the Universe as is myself, immeasurable.
Infinite is One,
=

And thanks John as well, this is a good place to think. = is

It may have been that this philosophical view of a perfect God that has everything under control was rather convenient for Leibniz. Maybe he saw opportunity in the imperfection and even in the evil. Not needing to worry about the status of his world because that is God?s responsibility/call freed Leibniz to focus on what he liked and did better ?the practical. If everything was perfect in the world, then probably an intellect like his - curious, original, advanced, practical - would not have had the same amount of opportunities to flourish. He saw opportunity in the chaos and thanked his perfect God for it.
我认为莱布尼茨所做的是一个聪明的举动，虽然有些自私:他把所有的问题都放在一个全能的、完美的、总是合理的存在之下，这样他就可以在这方面有所作为，这样解决全球范围内的问题就不是他的责任，相反，他可以专注于学习和推进实用的思想。
Leibniz surely was very astute; being such a practical intellect, maybe his thoughts were something like ?There?s so little I can do to fix this big mess (a.k.a. the world). It is probably better that I leave it to the almighty to take care of the impossible; he must have a reason for it.? So if God is taking care of the mess, then Leibniz can focus on what he knows to do best and feel content.

But there is such a stark contrast between a guy like Leibniz who is busily grinding axes throughout his work, and a guy like Newton, who was so clearly intent upon understanding and explaining, and in a way showing great respect for the reader or student of his work. He too had prejudicial attitudes, a bit of magic and alchemy, but his methods saw him through these blind alleys. He needed proof, and supplied it. In fact, he may have invented the modern notion of proof. "QED" ended his demonstrations. And it wasn't pretense.

我觉得很有趣，为什么莱布尼茨觉得他必须如此热情地捍卫对上帝的信仰。为什么他如此不愿意放弃这样一个“不可信的观点”(我不反对这个评价)?
There are two explanations for this that I'm hesitant to assent to, for the sake of giving Leibniz the benefit of the doubt. The first is the mere historical phenomenon that most intelligent people of his day believed in God. He was raised with such a belief, came to truly identify it with himself, and?finding himself unable to give up the belief?defaulted to defending it from criticism. I seek an alternative explanation than this, because I wish to give Leibniz more credit than being too stubborn to call out an unsupported position when he say one.
The other explanation involves what Or discussed above. That he sought this belief in God for more selfish reasons?they were not rationally justified, but selfishly convenient. Again, while this may be a possible, I encourage you to think about whether there's a more rational reason to explain why the universe makes more sense with God than without it.
我并没有声称对这个问题有一个答案，但也许它涉及到宇宙的起源(原动力论点)和道德?也许莱布尼茨认为只有在有上帝的宇宙中，这两种选择才有可能。或者他的推理更多地是关于在一个信仰体系中，一定程度的信仰是必要的?也许除了对逻辑和推理的“信仰”，他认为我们还必须对上帝有信仰。虽然我不是特别被这些论点所打动，但我认为它们可能是对这位大哲学家最仁慈的描述了。

We cannot unilaterally be the cause of belief. If you are not free to misunderstand me we cannot come to terms at all. But if I need you free to construe me as you will, subject to my response, confirming or objecting to your take on what I say, I cannot be the basis of that freedom. And yet neither can you be unilateral in that need of freedom of understanding between us. We cannot obligate each other's reasoning, and yet have in interest in freeing it in each other. There is a fundamental anxiety in reasoning and discourse. Some insist that a transcendental third is required. This misunderstanding simply reflects a lack of imagination or rational dexterity. But if you are burdened with a unilateral view of human reasoning and motive, a view that grew from applying the feudal notion of a personal covenant to religious doctrine, you naturally insist upon a transcendental anchor. In such a view it is insisted that without a god to reference we cannot be virtuous or undertake discourse, or even think.

By the way, the form of the feudal covenant as a personal relation to the god is the essential impetus to the Reformation. Leibniz was more the continuity of that era than he was the last of the Renaissance.

这个问题被提了出来，仿佛唯一合适的评论就是慷慨的赞扬。任何以上帝作为推理公理的人都不是“博学多才”。他是一个恶棍。在他生活的时代(17世纪后期)，在所有学术领域的能力并不像今天那样令人印象深刻。他的哲学的核心概念是单子。但“合一”并不能描述或解释人类的存在。我想知道汉·索罗会说什么，不是“这不是我的错!”，而是“这不是一个人的错!”我认为这是相当愚蠢的，尽管在某些语言中(如西班牙语)，这正是他会说的。好吧，有一个不满意。“人”不是一个量词，而是一个限定词。 It is the differing, and ultimately the loss, of what counts. And this is why there is no god, because the god cannot become itself by erasing itself from the count. But only such sefl-effacement is becoming the qualifier. I understand the desperation many have to avoid this effacement, it is the essence of the dreadful. But do it you will, and doing it you are. But god can't pull this off without denaturing itself altogether, because the god is the quantifier, not a qualifier or quality of anything at all. And if this proves god does not exist, it also explains why Leibniz does not impress one. Not this one, anyway.

Am new to this program -I have just listened to my first of this series.
The discussion of Leibniz, especially re the topics of Perfection and of Monad(s) etc, seemed to me to be narrow, lacking any familiarity with Chinese or Buddhist philosophical explorations of these areas. Two useful examples (among many) of those who clarified relevant topics are Fazang in circa 7th century China whose various works include extensive exploration of interdependent existence of myriad phenomena, and Eihei Dogen in 13th century Japan.
I hope that future Philosophy talks include Philosophy broaden the traditions and comparisons included.

With good reason. Asian "philosophy" puts an end to discussion, Western philosophy finds a recurrently new beginning. Now, tell me, which is "narrow"?

Actually, if you look at Asian texts, you will see that they have discussions both contemporaneously and across centuries, i.e. comments, commentaries and agreement/disagreement/alternatives, sometimes even included as side-bars on the "earlier" texts. So, am not sure on what basis you say "Asian "philosophy" puts an end to discussion."
If you wish, I can cite texts; certainly the texts of the 2 figures (Fazang and Dogen) I mentioned, have spawned many volumes and centuries of commentaries such as I mentioned above.
It is often the lack of familiarity with this vast opus of work that leads to comments such as yours. Even "Western" philosophy reflects the often unnoted influence of the Asian. For instance, a recent book on the Greek philosopher Pyrrho discusses at length the Buddhist influence on his work and on the subsequent Greek school of scepticism (Greek Buddha by C.I. Beckwith, Princeton University Press).

I am well aware of the vast bodies of "commentaries" that propagate themselves throughout Asian cultures, from the Talmud to the Upanishads to the endless stream of Zen texts. But you are greatly mistaken if you suppose this discussion. It is not, it is exegesis. It is the reinterpretation of existing texts, the ramifying analysis of oracle or prohesy or some supposed "wisdom", that is enslaved to antecedence. Discussion is the grappling of two or more living people willing to change their minds because hungry to find, amongst them, the unprecedented. This is why Asia has such a musty feel to it, in spite of its enthusiasm for the energy it derives from Western influences.

Using pejorative or judgmental words as in "that is enslaved to antecedence." and priviliging something as " find(ing), amongst them, the unprecedented" does not make it so.
Saying that Asia "has such a musty feel" does not make it so.
You have not dealt with the specific topics that I raised in the first comment nor with either of the philosophers I mentioned, nor the many others such as Nagarjuna who are relevant to this matter.

Gemel,
You clearly have not attained "no ox".
我没有特权，我在取消特权。例如，我们没有被理解的特权。我们必须从分歧中吸取教训，才能做到这一点。我并不想侮辱你，但我确实想去刺你或我所珍视的任何一头牛。我确实讨厌用罪恶来衡量西方。我们都有恶习，东方和西方都有，但西方有一种美德，它在不为人知的情况下发挥了最大的作用，在我看来，东方常年缺乏营养。我们都是在被牛顶着的过程中成长的，只有当我们变得更聪明，更明智地意识到所得到的好处时，我们才会认识到这一点。但在这样的讨论中，有必要切入正题，而且要明确地挑刺。如果这冒犯了你，我很抱歉，但我认为这也说明了重点。我知道西方在亚洲使用了大量的暴力，虽然还没有达到对自己使用暴力的程度。 But that is no reason to fail to look beyond the vice of colonialism. As for Nagarjuna, I suppose you do not mean Akkineni? Well, no. But I prefer questions to statements. In these discussions I also prefer what I call "table stakes", that is, your own opinion, not some source that can so easily distract us. But since you insist, I suggest, expecting nothing, that you take a look at the discussion between Thrasymachus and Socrates in the Republic (337A to the end of book one). What penalty, asks Thrasymachus, for being proven wrong? Until we see the benefit, the penalty is painful, as having one's ox gored always is until we attain "no ox".
如果你再等这么久才回复，这个帖子也会被忽略。