Interesting exercise.
The first step in the process that Ken describes seems by far the most critical: what is the goal or "want," and what values does it reflect? If my goals are to proclaim my affluence to the world and bully my way through traffic, I might decide to buy a Hummer (R.I.P.!) despite the obvious conflicts with other values (humility, reduction of resource consumption and carbon footprint, traffic safety and so forth). But I could achieve the same goals by other means, like buying a supersized Ford Intimidator or something similar. The decision about a suitable means seems more amenable to rational analysis, and less laden with emotional baggage, than the initial "want" calculation.
另一个例子:如果一个社会决定确保其100%的人口获得足够的医疗保健，“单一付款人”系统很快就会成为实现这一目标的最合理手段(尽管其他方案可能值得考虑)。但当其他价值观(比如所谓的节省纳税人的钱和“个人责任”)发生冲突时，手段分析导致了今年出现的那种香肠立法。
This is not to say that the decision about means is unimportant and always rational, but that choice often follows from the fundamental decision about ends. Or so it seems to me at the moment.
I look forward to downloading the podcast.

Intriguing. This may change the way I see my boss; what he values is my production, because it is his responsibility; my happiness is not his, so he assumes it can go away without any change in production.

Through out our whole life we are seeking out the thing which we exactly want but fail to identify that. If we never understand ourselves then how could we judge that we are rational? It?s like illusions.

这是一个迫切需要一些逻辑入门的领域，以做出一些简单的区分和观点。以下是我认为哲学家们可以做出的贡献，从他们对英语翻译的理解开始，然后转化为实质性的含义。
重述“如果”、“然后”和“重大意义”。
If we want a simply formal model of the english if, then, our formal translation is uniquely satisfied by material implication if:
a) the translation is truth functional, doesn't depend on the semantic parts in "if a, then b."
b) the translation preserves two formal features of the english if, then.
1) if then is reflexive.
2) if then is not sysmetric.
c) finally, the truth value for if then when a is true and b is false is false.
We translate the english if then, such that it is a truth functional translation which preserves several formal features.
因此，我们既发现了物质蕴涵的悖论，也发现即使是聪明的人也无法在沃森的选择任务中找到物质蕴涵。
These two features, some odd formal paradoxes and the inability of english users to recognize the formal translation are good analogues to what is happening in preference theory. Here is why.
Preference Theory
We start with with the english relation "x is preferred to y" or the choices "x is chosen over y" and translate the preference talk or choices into a formal structure, a formal translation.
But unlike if then, this translation depends upon us first identifying a body of choices or preferences that appear reasonable.
然后，给定特定的形式考虑比如选择理论中的属性，我们可以转换这些选择并确定它们在形式上是否合理。
如果不是这样，我们就有两种不同的选择:a)最初的选择模式不合理，或b)我们的形式理性概念必须修改。(这些困难的选择中有两个是脱离理性选择理论的基础。)
What most economists fail to do is to specify if the alleged failure shows:
a) the translation was not truth functional, and the preference talk lacks certain formal characteristics. Framing examples come to mind here.
b) the translation or model was truth functional, but the irrationality in model shows that we were mistaken about the original choice talk being reasonable. We have now found something new. The money pump arguments comet to mind here.
c) the translation failed, much the same way english users don't perceive themselves to be using material implication.
D)最初的选择谈话是出于合理的行为，但为了适应这种翻译，形式上的考虑必须改变。在这种背景下，值得注意的是，大多数情境相关选择的例子都不能被集合论选择理论所捕获。如果a的加入改变了b和c的关系，那么b和c的关系就不是有序对。
Getting an economist to hew to one of these positions would be useful. (Not withstanding, I do like Ariely's experiments because they are fresh - but if someone is predictable in their choices, then they are maximizing something.)

Most people make decisions not based on reality, but based on fear or emotions. That is where the problems lie. If we make decisions based on what is real, then good decisions are made.

Is not the part of the excitement being a human that we are irrational,bit odd,and make decisions with emotions and depending on our mood at the time can be great ideas or really bad-

Very few of us are trained to think properly. Few of us get any psychology and fewer any neuroscience.
For starters, many choke on poor language skills. Parsing errors are ubiquitous. Minimizing ambiguity is both science and art.
然后再加上大量令人食欲大增的逻辑谬误。
Finally, toss in a wide variety of half-baked heuristics, cognitive biases, and off-label implicit associations and nobody can agree on the basic facts much less digest what they might mean.
In this internet + Google world there is no excuse not to shift more k-12 curriculum towards linguistic and reasoning skills--from facts to fact checking.
Poor Richard
Poor Richard's Almanack 2010