The term "free-will" has been used in philosophy and theology to formulate a number of different problems. Here are some of them:

1) If there is an omniscient God --- that is, a God who knows everything --- can we act freely? How can what we do be up to us, if God already knows what we are going to do?

2) If every event, including human actions --- events that consist of a human being doing something --- is caused by the events that lead up to the event, can human actions be free? If the past determines what we do, how can what we do be up to us?

3)亚当和夏娃吃了苹果，犯了原罪，诅咒所有未来的人类之后，人类还有能力按照自己的“自由意志”去做正确的事情吗?还是说这需要上帝的恩典，所以我们中只有那些上帝选择施恩的人才能成为正义的人?这就是英国修道士珀拉修斯和圣奥古斯丁的分歧所在。佩拉吉厄斯认为答案是肯定的，奥古斯丁认为答案是否定的。奥古斯丁赢得了教义之战，所以伯拉基乌斯的观点现在被称为“伯拉基异端”，已经持续了大约1600年。这个问题在宗教改革时期也被激烈讨论过，比如路德和伊拉斯谟的作品。

Augustine, interestingly enough, argued in his Dialogue on Free-Will that humans can have free-will in sense 1). This seems to conflict a bit with his answer to question 3). Augustine explains that in his discussion of question 1) he was thinking of Adam before the Fall. Part of the Fall was losing part of our free-will; we can freely choose to sin, but we need God's grace to do the right thing. At least that's how I understand these vexed issues of Christian theology. Maybe some reader or listener who has a better grip on them can straighten me out.

当我们在周二(3月29日)的节目中讨论自由意志是否是一种幻觉时，我们可能不会讨论第3个问题。我也怀疑我们会花很多时间在1)上，尽管它可能会出现。我之所以说这么多，是因为我们许多人早年在主日学校里就在这个背景下听说过“自由意志”，它与其他问题的联系可能会令人困惑。

就其价值而言，我的印象是，尽管佩拉基乌斯的观点成了异端，路德、加尔文和其他强硬派在宗教改革中影响最大，但今天的基督徒，无论是天主教徒、路德教徒还是长老会教徒，大多都是真正的佩拉基教徒。说到这里，也许了解更多的人可以帮我澄清一下。

我们周二节目的嘉宾，约翰·菲舍尔，是讨论第二个问题的当代主要哲学家之一。他也因研究宗教哲学而闻名，所以也许他也会就第一个问题说一点。他的主要兴趣，以及今天大多数关于自由意志的哲学家的兴趣，不是自由意志和全知的上帝之间的联系，或形而上学的罪，而是自由意志和道德责任之间的联系。

The connection is that free-will seems to be required for moral responsibility. If I do something wrong, I can expect to be held responsible for it. But what if I had no choice? What if I could not have done otherwise? What if I wasn't free? Then it seems I am not really responsible. And if we are never free, we are never morally responisble. So there seems to be a tight connection between having free-will have moral responsibility. If there is a problem with free-will, there seems also be be a problem with moral responsibility.

自由意志似乎确实存在问题。Neil Van Leeuwen, a graduate student who helps us with Philosophy Talk, credits Allen Wood, a colleague of Ken's and mine at Stanford, with the following succinct statement of the problem:

Commonsense says we have free will. Commonsense says our actions are determined. And commonsense says that free will and determinism are inconsistent. So no matter what you say you have a contradiction with commonsense.

Suppose Ken and I are sitting at KALW, just before the program begins. I have forgotten to get myself a styrofoam cup of water, which I badly need, and there isn't time to run and get one. There is one sitting beside Ken, which he has has clearly gone and gotten in his responsible way. While he isn't looking, I snatch his cup and move it over to my side of the table. He looks for his water. Since styrofoam cups of water look exactly alike, he has no reason to suspect the one by me is really his. I say, "I think you left it down the hall." He runs off to get another cup, is late for the beginning of the show, and earns a dirty look from Amy Standen, the Roving Philosophical Reporter, who also is our on-the-air producer. I look innocent.

直觉上，我有一个选择。我本可以自己跑掉，或者不喝水。我自由地选择做错误的事情;偷水，然后撒谎。所以，直觉上，我对我的行为，以及它所有可预见的后果负有道德责任:肯恩会匆匆离去，他会很晚才回来，他会被艾米无情地瞪一眼，也许还有很多其他的事情。

But look. Why did I do what I did? Because I am irresponsible, and didn't get my own water; because I badly wanted the water; and because I have a very weak character that is unable to resist temptation, and a well-developed ability to cope with guilt. Why am I that way? Some combination of nature and nurture. I didn't choose to be lazy, irresponsible, and prone to thirst. And yet, given those causes, my act had to ensue, didn't it? The laws of nature guarantee that wretches such as me will steal water and lie in these circumstances. Probably I am just a complex physical system, so each of these things--- my thirst, my irresponsibility, my laziness, my inability to resist temptation---are really just physical states of me. Not taking the water would mean violating the laws of nature. But no one can violate the laws of nature. So don't blame me.

Intuitively, if my theft of Ken's water is caused by antecedent conditions, by the deterministic unfolding of a chain of causes and effect that began long before I was even born, I wasn't free to do anything else. Intuitively, everything does have a cause. And yet, intuitively, I am morally responsible for my theft, because intuitively I had a choice.

这给我们带来了什么?在自由意志的问题上。约翰·菲舍尔，和许多哲学家一样，认为我们必须放弃一些直觉。There are three places philosopher have tried to break the dilemma:

• Deny that all human action are caused by previous conditions; usually called "libertarianism"; this is not the same as the political doctrine advocated by Ayn Rand among others, although most libertarians in that sense are also libertarians in this one;

• Maintain that even if an act is caused by previous conditions, it can still be free; the conflict between causation (or determinism, or in an old-fashioned use of the word, necessity) is an illusion; this was Hume's view, and is now usually called "compatibilism";

• Distinguish between metaphyisical freedom and the freedom required for moral responsibility. If every human act is caused by previous conditions we don't have metaphysical freedom; we can't really do otherwise than we do. But we still have the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility.

This last view is held by our guest, John Fischer; he calls it "semi-compatibilism." Tuesday we'll give him a chance to explain and defend it.