Thanks toMartha Nussbaumfor being a fine guest. We've been trying to get her on the program for two years. And we're please that she was finally able to do it. It was certainly a lively and entertaining conversation that probed some philosophically interesting issues. I haven’t yet had a chance yet to read her two big recent books on the emotions,Upheavals of ThoughtandHiding from Humanity : Disgust, Shame, and the Law, but both sound fascinating. They are definitely on my list.

我仍然不完全相信情绪不过是判断。当然，情绪与判断是紧密联系在一起的，有时还相当紧密。但说情感只是一种判断似乎是错误的。判断可以是真或假。任何给定的判断，甚至是关于我自己的繁荣的判断，都可以有或没有伴随的情感。另一方面，情绪有时是恰当的，有时是不恰当的，但它们似乎不是那种可以是真或假的事情。同样，情绪，至少是有意识的情绪，似乎有一个感觉的定性特征，但判断，甚至是有意识的判断，没有。这就像(有意识地)生气一样。但是判断自己被冤枉是什么感觉呢?Such a judgment mightcause愤怒的发作But could such a judgment really justbe愤怒的发作?

Nussbaum is of course well aware of these kinds of criticisms of theories that try to reduce emotions to judgments. As far as I can tell, she thinks that she can get around the typical criticisms of cognitive theories of emotions by tinkering with the contents of the relevant judgments. That’s why she says that emotions are judgments with what she calls a self-referential “eudaimonistic” component. Emotions, she says, “are appraisals or value judgments, which ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s own control great importance for that person’s own flourishing.” The thought here must be that if emotions are evaluations that have intrinsic reference to the subject’s own flourishing, they will be intrinsically but defeasibly motivating in the way that emotions seem to be. Emotions have a strong tendency to move us to act – sometimes, of course, against our better judgment. And perhaps evaluations of the sort with which Nussbaum wants to identify emotions might have something like the same strong tendency to move us to act.

最后，我怀疑它是否有效。这种方法可能会解决这样的担忧，即判断是否会像情绪一样打动我们。正是这种“理性”在缺乏激情的情况下无力独自推动我们的思想，导致休谟提出了他著名的口号:理性是而且应该是激情的奴隶。如果你认为情绪是内在激励，而判断不是，那你就有理由否认情绪是判断。但是，仅仅表明某些类型的判断——与个人繁荣有关的评价性判断——具有激励作用，还不足以表明情绪只是这样的判断。会吗?不要再担心情绪和判断之间的差异了。有意识的情绪感觉像某种东西。判断不。判断是真还是假。 Emotions aren't. They are appropriate or inappropriate to a situation, perhaps when based on a bad judgments. Emotions conflict with judgments in different ways from the way judgments conflict with each other. Two judgments may be inconsistent, but held at the same time. But when judgment is overcome by emotion, it doesn't really seem like just more judging happening. Does it?

另外，还有约翰关于“原始关怀”的准休谟观点。我不确定约翰到底是什么意思。我认为，原始的部分与它是一种关怀形式有关，它不能被分析为其他东西，比如判断。我认为关心的部分是内在的和“根本的”动机。也许大多数人都很关心他们自己的幸福。但似乎可能有人甚至不能基本地关心他或她自己的繁荣，因此不能被努斯鲍姆式的评价判断所感动，但仍然以不同的方式被各种情绪所感动。

I don’t take any of these to be absolutely knock-down arguments against Nussbaum. Besides, even if she gets the metaphysical nature of the emotions wrong, she gets a lot about them absolutely right -- including their deep and perhaps intrinsic connection to our cognition and representation of the world as mattering to us in various ways. And she is certainly right to insist that emotions are not just blind, distracting intrusions upon rational thought, as some philosophers and macho-cultural formations, once had it.

当然，这只是故事的开始，而不是结束。显然，调节我们的情绪，使其适应我们对什么是重要的深思熟虑的判断，是一件棘手的事情。有时候，一个人会对那些我们认为值得我们生气、同情或爱的人感到太多或太少的愤怒、同情或爱。在我看来，在美好的生活中，情感和判断就像手和手套一样协同工作。判断帮助一个人追踪真相，而情感帮助一个人以尊重美好的方式前进。