Finding solutions to problem of free will is of immediate importance to all moral philosophers and philosophers of action. Free will is becoming more and more dubious as contemporary arguments for materialism and determinism seem to be incompatible with free will.
Here's the concepts in the simplest terms possible:
物质主义——物质世界就是一切。
Determinism - every event is casually determined by prior events
Free will - humans (or rational agents) have control over their actions and decisions
Common problems:
-如果每个事件都是由之前的事件随意决定的，自由意志怎么可能?
- If my will to move my hand is an entirely physical event, then isn't my will determined by physical mechanisms which I lack control over (i.e. the will is just the illusion of choice and, in actuality, is caused by a chain of physical occurrences)?
I don't have the time to go into the complexities and nuances of the debate between free will and determinism or materialism, but I will supply some links below to those interested in the problem of free will:
A good start (the bibliography lists some of the essential literature) -http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
A blog run by UC Riverside -http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/
Another method is to type "free will" into JSTOR and prepare to read.

所谓的物质二元论在一神论者中相对流行的一个原因是，实际上存在一种潜在的物质一元论(因为造物是在本质上简单的上帝之后出现的)。这也许是保留“笛卡尔二元论”这个老名字的一个原因。(另一个原因是，我们可能会想起解析几何中的笛卡尔坐标——伟大的科学家并不害怕这个假设。)所以我认为没有什么合理的理由来支持笛卡尔二元论的主张应该得到捍卫。那么多原因是什么呢?
Note that the dualism is soul and brain, rather than mind and body. Even on Cartesian dualism, the form of the mind is determined in large part by the structure of the brain. Cartesian dualists are fans of science, but they also see a need for something like a soul, and can see no rational grounds for discounting that particular possibility. They do not make a mystery of mind; rather, mind is a mystery! And if we have souls, then souls are even more of a mystery (as is an elementary particle of course, which is simply assumed to have no internal structure for the purposes of a fundamental theory). As for the soul-brain interaction, that is less of a mystery since the work of Sir Karl Popper on the (realistic) propensity interpretation of quantum-mechanical probabilities.
All the alternative interpretations of such probabilities remain seriously flawed. And while the governing equations of the interaction remain a mystery, that is surely more of a reason to pursue research into it (e.g. via experiments on micro-PK) than to ignore it prematurely (on the grounds that Cartesian Substance dualism is dead). Cartesian dualism is often dismissed summarily on the grounds of physical closure, so note that such closure has not yet been demonstrated. It is not a matter of not observing ordinary objects levitating, but of being able to rule out any micro-PK effects upon the chemicals within thinking brains, and such experiments just have not been done.

Footnote on scientific respectability: The Nobel-prize-winning neurophysiologist Sir John Eccles was a Cartesian dualist (see his 1994 book "How the Self Controls Its Brain").

E.J. Lowe advocates a view that he calls Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD). Here's a much-too-brief description:

NCSD maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as `substances' in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence.

As I understand the concept, dualism refers to about 1/2 physics and the rest metaphysics. Also, it should apply to some degree to the higher mammals at least (a bit of a sobering thought).
尽管许多人否认，量子物理仍然在与波函数“塌缩”(非“退相干”)和“维格纳的朋友”论点(解决严格量子不确定性的“观察者”是什么)搏斗。随着牛顿或拉普拉斯决定论的消亡，神经系统功能基础上的因果关系肯定也同样消失了。
有一件事是肯定的:没有人知道如何“科学地解释”人类(或动物?? ?)的意识，而且在人类对宇宙的认识方面，任何其他的主张都是无中生有的。

As I understand the concept, dualism refers to about 1/2 physics and the rest metaphysics. Also, it should apply to some degree to the higher mammals at least (a bit of a sobering thought).
尽管许多人否认，量子物理仍然在与波函数“塌缩”(非“退相干”)和“维格纳的朋友”论点(解决严格量子不确定性的“观察者”是什么)搏斗。随着牛顿或拉普拉斯决定论的消亡，神经系统功能基础上的因果关系肯定也同样消失了。
有一件事是肯定的:没有人知道如何“科学地解释”人类(或动物?? ?)的意识，而且在人类对宇宙的认识方面，任何其他的主张都是无中生有的。

"And there exists a pretty powerful argument to the effect that the intrinsic qualitative characters of our experiences couldn't possibly be (fully) explained by physics, biology, or psychology."
The argument seems to be that because we can clearly and distinctly conceive of a duplicate of our world in respect of its "extrinsic" properties (call these "E-properties") that is phenomenally void, an explanation for consciousness will have to reside in so-called "intrinsic" properties (call these "I-properties").
The obvious problem with this argument is that we can just as clearly and distinctly conceive of a duplicate of our world in respect of both E- and I-properties that is phenomenally void! In other words, the argument only works by stipulating that its hypothesized-but-unspecified property class contains all and only those properties required to give rise to (and to explain) consciousness.

Some commentary here:http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/posts/1218935596.shtml

Mr. Vallicella's offering may yet be proof that there are things that can exist and yet have no substance.

The post on Vallicella's blog is highly relevant because, as he has shown, there is no clear verdict on the debate between dualism and materialism.
一个公正的方法是好的哲学思考的关键。不幸的是，时髦的思维常常导致哲学家们驳回这些主张，甚至没有提供一个令人信服的论据来说明为什么这些主张应该被驳回。
Dogmatism has historically been the greatest impediment to philosophical progress, and I doubt that that will change. Logic was more or less unchallenged since Aristotle until Frege came along. A similar story follows from Plato's idealism. Likewise, in our day, the canonical doctrine seems to be that of scientific naturalism, which is likely due to Quine's influence. While it is possible that science will eventually explain mental phenomena, there is no conclusive evidence to support that possibility. Conclusions ought to be reached through arguments, not through appeals to prejudice.

One musn't forget, in this context philosophers who may fall into the none of the above category. My personal favorite for nomination is Galen Strawson, whose peculiar brand of panpsychicism avoids many of the traps of both old dualism and Dennett style modern monism.

优秀的思想……
www.few-cents.blogspot.com

It seems very easy to get lost in the idea that imagination makes the mind greater than the brain or at least immaterial. My problem is if the mind is separate and either bound by different laws or bound by none at all then why is it so much narrower in scope from the brain? Neurologists like Ramachandran seem to be making great strides in decoding things like synesthesia which tricks the senses and showing us all of the things our brain does without us being aware of it. I know from personal experience that I can cut myself and my body bleeds and I assume cellular activity changes and my heartrate as well but I can remain unaware of the pain from the cut until I notice the blood. This seems to me strong evidence, although i realize it may never be conclusive, that the mind and brain are not only one but that the mind is the lesser of the two.
Everyone has heard the hardware/software comparrison but I think it is even far simpler than that and the brain is the software, the body the hardware and consciousness merely a query that responds to commands as in a computer.
我认为，从心理学的角度来看，没有什么比计算机更类似了。可以说是人类最伟大最具人性的创造物当然也是最接近人体的操作程序。计算机有大脑、中枢神经系统、感官处理器和外围设备。在我看来，这是显而易见的，它是根据我们自己的形象创建的，它反映了我们的操作系统尽可能真实。
My one question would be that if consciousness is part of the physical brain, as an artist myself, would I truly be capable of originality or do I merely construct images based on things that I have experienced in my own life? Is the level of artisic creativity then the measure of how many different sources an artist uses to construct an image?

It is philosophically irresponsible to claim that there is almost no rational grounds for believing in Cartesian Dualism. There are many well-educated and quite sophisticated philosophers, like Richard Swinburne of Oxford and Alvin Plantinga of Notre Dame who believe in a similar dualism to that of the Cartesian kind, just to name a few.
此外，声称笛卡尔二元论使身心问题变得神秘，当然不是反对笛卡尔二元论的逻辑兼形而上学的论点。宇宙是如何起源的，这很可能是一个谜，但它实际上并不是没有起源的。只是声称这是一个谜，并不是说大爆炸没有发生。笛卡尔二元论也是如此。仅仅宣称这是一个关于这些不同实体如何相互作用的谜，并不能成为反对这一论点本身的论据。