为了让这个问题继续下去，我在我的个人博客上交叉发布了一个版本。A reader posted the following comment:
或者，也许更自然的是，这可以被解释为反对自由意志的论点(至少反对传统的自由意志的概念，一些相容主义者对自由意志的描述与决定论是相容的)。我同意你对纽科姆的总结和分析。从第二段到最后一段结束。但是，我认为下面这句话是不正确的:那么，宇宙的因果历史会因我是选择了两个盒子还是只选择了B盒子而不同。宇宙的因果历史是，假设，过去和确定的，因此正确的表述是:我选择两个盒子还是只选择盒子B取决于宇宙的因果历史。这是决定论的一个基本前提，即未来完全由过去决定。
所以一个决定论主义者会这样解释下面这段话:让?假设我想要宇宙的因果历史导致我得到100万美元。那么我只会选择B框。你只选择了B，这个预测者在它发生之前就知道的事实，证明了世界的因果历史是这样那样的。因此，决定论会争辩说，你在下一个陈述中有解释的优先权:这似乎需要我的选择导致过去是一种方式，而不是另一种方式。相反，过去让你做出了这样的选择，那种自由的感觉，在标准的决定论中，只是一种幻觉。决定论者会完全同意吗?事实上，不管我做了什么选择，它都不是?过去的一切似乎都将改变。再说一次，这件事已经根据假设解决了。？ But use this to draw the opposite conclusion, namely that based on our intuition of the immutability of the past, we cannot coherently regard our actions as being ?free?.
Any thoughts?

For the argument based on univironmental determinism see:http://www.scientificphilosophy.com/
Glenn

Sorry, I think the paradox is just an illustration of how hard it is to accept determinism in the face of our everyday experience of free choice. Alas, if determinism rules we don't actually have free choice, so we can stop agonizing about the consequences for the past world of our choosing one box or two.
The real question is how to reconcile these two apparently contradictory aspects of life - our experience of determinism in the laws by which the physical world runs, and our experience of free choice in our interior worlds. The answer? The contradiction is apparent rather than real, because the two experiences are orthogonal. We see an external world when we look out, and an internal world when we look in. An act of perception is a glimpse of the world out there *or* of the world in here, never together. Nothing that we discover or infer externally has any necessary implication for our interior experience. The brain makes a good job of synthesizing, of course, but don't be misled. We can recognize physical law in the world without giving up on our experience of free choice. Both realms of human experience are equally valid.
I and Thou: the above deals only with our individual experience of choice. A tricky question remains about other people, who seem to inhabit the deterministic physical world but also claim to make free choices. We'll maybe try to catch that later ...
Hugh

Some thought experiments are just for fun. Newcomb's is one such.
Once you grant a Predictor, you accept determinism.
But this scenario requires another genie, the one that takes note of the Predictor's prediction, and adjusts reality accordingly. Predicting is not causing. It ought to be based on a knowledge of causation, of course. Doesn't this paradox remind one of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God?
I think we ought to use the term "free" more carefully. Specifically, we ought to always include "from ____." We ought always to say what something is free from, when we claim it is free. Then, we ought to require ourselves to show that what we say it is free from, it might not be free from. That keeps us in the realm of actual things and phenomena. Our intellectual powers are well tested within that realm, much less being supposed to succeed where the impossible and ill-defined are posited as a starting point.

My brain lacks the kind of Predictor concept required to make this Newcomb's Paradox seem like a paradox to me. So, I see no difference between this thought experiment and one in which I get to place a million$ in an otherwise empty box B in the case in which you do not chose box B. This way, in the case in which you do chose box B, box B will be empty as required by Newcomb's version. Or, if I don't have a Million$, I can just not bother with box B, and the result for you will remain the same whether you chose box B or not.
还有一个类似的思想实验，关于全知，在我看来就像纽科姆的实验一样空洞。它说的是，在一场有全知者的“懦夫”游戏中，你要赢得游戏所要做的只是决定在最后一刻不转向一边，决定径直向前行驶，表面上迫使全知者转向一边(假设全知者在一开始就知道你的预先决定而不承认失败)。这个思想实验的几个基本问题中的前两个是，我们实际上不知道我们与之博弈的一个给定实体是无所不知的，而且，即使我们相信某些这样的实体是无所不知的，我们也不知道一个无所不知的人是否知道如何，以完全公平的方式，让我们在最后一刻改变我们的预先决定。
Oops. "If you take box B only, then it contains a million$". Well, then I better have a milllion$ to give you for taking only box B. In any case, the problem I'm seeing (assuming it is a problem, and not some mistake on my part to understand the thought experiment) is that, given the variability of content of box B specified by the thought experiment, how did that million$ get in box B in the first place in the case in which you chose only box B? If box B has the option of being empty...
但是，我想我们面对的是你的实际选择，而不是…不管是什么，在思维实验中，似乎允许盒子B可能是空的。有人有扳手吗?我认为这个悖论正在泄露。

Considering the nature of a paradox, the lack of conclusion in it, we might look for truth in what we know for sure.Since we are truly happy only when we accept determanism, it might be a hint of truth.

My own sense of this paradox is that it shows that "rational" has two meanings. There's a sense in which it is "irrational" to choose just one box, and another in which it's irrational to choose both. But those who care more about the money than being sufficiently "sciency" about this matter, need not believe they are somehow affecting the past. They are simply making the bet that routinely produces the most money.
That's the kind of "rationality" one wants one's financial advisors to exhibit, no? In addition, it's the kind of rationality that would make one prefer to allow oneself to be "cured" by a placebo. When one is cured by a sugar pill, there's no reason to suppose that he or she has some theory about reverse causation: the same is true here.

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Interesting!
First, determinism as a theory of how everything works is almost certainly false. Outcomes of measurements at the quantum level appear to have a random aspect. Originally it seemed possible that so-called hidden variables might account for the varying outcomes, but theoretical work in the 1960s led to experiments since then, including ones being actively carried out now, that have eliminated almost all possibilities for hidden variables. People and our brains, being big (compared to subatomic particles) and hot (compared to absolute zero) may be virtually exempt from quantum indeterminacy, but even so someone playing the Newcomb game could decide, let's assume deterministically, to put the decision about the boxes under control of a quantum process such as whether a particular radioactive decay happened or not within a certain time. In that case the decision would be non-deterministic and radically resistant even to the fantastic predictive powers imputed to the Predictor.
然而，预测器可以规定，任何玩游戏的人都不能使用这种量子过程来做决定。(游戏邦注:玩家不能抱怨，因为他们没有什么可失去的，并且可以通过放弃所有哲学上的痛苦而获得1000美元。)即使玩家试图为了最大化收益而分析情况，我也不认为这是悖论。如果Predictor的目标是不超过1000美元，它就会在考虑到玩家的所有未来想法后设置箱子。玩家将尝试着去揣度预测者在过去所做的事情:“预测者认为它知道我将做什么，但我将通过……欺骗它”，但这一切都是徒劳的，因为在设置盒子时，预测者已经知道这些想法将会发生。也许“它认为我要做X，所以我要做Y”会导致无限循环或回归，但如果必须在有限时间内做出盒子的选择，预测器就会确切地知道循环会发生多少次迭代，因此也就知道盒子决策会是什么。当那一刻到来时，玩家便能够做出完全自由的选择(游戏邦注:无需使用枪支，无需纠结于任何与字母“a”有关的内容，并能够做出任何经过深思熟虑的选择)，但预测者却能够根据假设知道什么时候设置了选择，并据此放置金钱。
The appearance of paradox in the story attached to the game comes, I think, from slipping in a random or supernatural basis for the Player's thinking, which contradicts the determinism implied in the Predictor's assumed powers.