What would an essentialist account of optimism look like? It would have to demonstrate in what way or ways the optimizer is identical with what one is optimistic about. And identity is usually conceived in two ways: qualitative, which is loose identity on basis of predicate association (obtained by varying degrees of precision), and quantitative, which is strict identity on basis of self-association of the subject. Even if this latter can not be established to the exclusion of alternates, it holds categorically by subjective presupposition for purposes of internal coherence. The essential optimist is by this someone who doesn't fall apart when everything around him/her does. Therefore the essentialist account of optimism is Stoicism in its classical form.

但如上文所述，量的同一性实际上只是质的同一性的最严格的形式，与质的同一性并没有绝对的区别。这就意味着本质主义的观点，在这种情况下，是不正确的。这也就是说，真正的禁欲主义者并不是真正的乐观主义者。相反，这需要一个连贯的叙述，一个人的乐观就是另一个人的悲观。如果是这样的话，它就不能指任何本身是实体性的东西，而必须是从具有实体性的东西中派生出来的。但事实证明，这个“东西”是一个人所乐观的东西，而不是乐观所构成的精神状态。

因此，前后一致的叙述是一个恶性循环。一个人对某事持乐观态度，因为有可能会有更好的事情发生，或者事情没有那么糟糕;这并没有那么糟糕，因为人们对此持乐观态度，所以有可能出现更好的情况。请注意，这只是描述了一种态度或精神状态与其内容和关联的上下文的结合。作为对世界一部分的描述，而不是与之对应，将连贯论者的观点描述为自我实现的预言将是过分热情和不准确的。它是在特定情况下发现的，有各种各样的描述。

It appears, then, that the distinction between optimism and pessimism is a superficial one, referring rather to topical responses to particular states of affairs, and playing no detectable role in their outcome. A better terminology to refer to their objects would therefore be sensibility and irritability, as that would more fully indicate the situation to which one or the other is a response. Sensitivity is associated with information-input, and therefore sufficiency of judgement-relationship to truth-contents; whereas irritability precludes given categories of stimulation, and therefore does not contribute to analysis of more complex levels of experience contents.

事实证明，乐观主义既不能从本质论的角度，也不能从连贯论的角度来解读，而只能从真实的角度来解读。它指的是一种人类学上的近似，在一个全面的背景下被描述为宇宙学知识或宇宙知识，可分为不同的情况，在这些情况下，可以观察到对一个情况的真相的敏感性，和对一个人不想听到的情况的易怒的关系。

Further implied here is that there is no indifference to this distinction, which is formally bi-valent, once the veridical view is assumed. Regardless of the circumstances, one or the other more or less predominates. So how can the present forum-participant express appropriate sensitivity to the relevant state of affairs? Perhaps this would be best expressed by taking note of the fact that participation in the public utility of an intellectual exchange-venue is in principle universal, so that it must be considered a defect where its use lacks a high number of contributors. So can a consideration of the possibility of many future contributors, rather that the current actuality of the paltry few, constitute a true sensitivity to the forum's situation as a public utility, and therefore be not incorrectly describable as "optimistic" in the traditional sense?

As the question of optimism has to do with expectations, it can be posed in the most basic of ways, e.g. as to whether or not the human species will survive another thirty years. As such, optimism is the counter-valence to likelihood of catastrophe-proximity. By emphasizing the practical aspect, optimism is not solely reduceable to the sensibility of epistemic accommodation of corresponding elements, as it was put above, but also what would be classified as irritability by the above distinction: an explicit denial of knowledge-justification in practical decisions under conditions insufficient for continued or sustainable existence. The goal of continued existence overrides confirmation-requirements for grounds of agency. Optimism in its purely practical aspect is therefore a bet that things won't turn out as bad as it looks like they're going to. If nothing is done where nothing can be known, the catastrophe is sure to follow. But if something is done where nothing can be known, it just might do the trick. If it does, you've won the bet. If it doesn't, what have you really lost? This therefore I would describe as the non-superficial view for Optimism, as an axiomatic assumption for a practical operator.

Hence as a practical matter, erosion of human life-sustainability on the earth's crust and an unwieldiness of destructive technical capacity furnish together the sufficient condition for deployment of the Optimism-principle, deemed as practically necessary while underdetermined by sufficient theoretical grounds. What might such a deployment look like? At the risk of false-dichotomy, would we be talking about a new society, or just tinkering with the effects of the old one?

请尽量不要同时插话，因为有足够的空间让每个人都能被听到。当然，没有人会用琐碎或无关紧要的声明来攻击这里的讨论参与者，因为这个话题涉及人类的普遍生存，以及受教育阶层是否有能力为潜在的不可能提供适当的补救措施。然而，对于那些认为存在这样一种补救办法，其任何形式的补救办法都足以使被规定使用这种办法的人得到全面的照顾的人来说，这种办法必须显得特别不发达。

首先，应当采取保护措施的形式。从广义的生态意义上说，应该保护地壳的有机健康。因为这不是一种对可以抛弃的东西的偏好，而是对生存标准的约束，意志的基础是不够的，而应该是“权利”，可以说，保持生存，或为下一代做同样的事情。然而，由于人类在生态上并不是孤立的，不仅动物也有这种权利，蔬菜也有。在自我主张这种权利的过程中，如果一个蔬菜可以通过其律师起诉政府或跨国公司，这将不是一个闻所未闻的事件。这一点可能产生的轻蔑的含义必须立即放弃，因为正是通过这样一种植物的自我主张，整个植物群体通常不受保护，可以进入法院系统，因此受到法律的保护。只有通过这样的法律保护，主要的陆地造林区域才能得到保护。(国家是另一个问题，毫无争议的是，一个社会的功能性法律标准与任何国家权力的结构安排来自不同的来源。)

美国宪法第九条修正案应该这样解释，即保护所有不需要写下来的预设权利。因为这是后来被称为人权的法律体系，这棵植物也从它继承了其基本的法律信誉。这里面有什么吗?对于即将发生的陆地灾难的可能性，一个适当的方法的主要部分应该是国际植物性法律的联合主张吗?

I'm looking forward to this episode. I haven't thought much about different ways of conceiving optimism. I need more time. But I like the idea of treating it as a bet on the future. To add to the mix, I have long held on to the view that Hope is different than Optimism. I learned this from Cornel West. I want to say I first read about it in American Evasion of Philosophy, but know he's talked about it recently. Can one have hope even while being uncommitted to any expectations about the future? Can one have hope even while expecting matters to worsen? Sometimes I even hope for one outcome, while betting on a different outcome. Thanks for this timely and important topic.

这似乎取决于人们对什么抱有希望或乐观的态度。比如有人说“看起来要下雨了，但我希望不会下雨”。在这里，希望构成了对不良物体感知到的可能性的一种情绪反应，但希望不能影响概率判断的对象。但如果有人说:“我没有看到任何与我的领域相关的工作，但我希望我能找到一份。”在这里，希望可以对关于同一对象的未来概率判断产生建设性的影响，从而相互帮助确定它。在我看来，这种二分法的问题在于，乐观被描述为一种被动的理性评估，而希望是一种主动的情感认同，因此，缺乏前者必然是后者的前提，因此，缺乏乐观似乎只是一种描述希望是一种回应的通用谓词的方式。一个共同的或集体的希望是如何与一个不太可能但又必要的对象联系起来的?讨论集体行动的非理性情感基础，而不是理性的情感基础，是否有意义?

这个问题是希望和乐观之间的区别，还是不考虑其他因素的区别?例如，我认为在毫无根据的希望和有一些(或强或弱)基础的乐观之间有一个有意义的区别。但还有其他因素。是的，有时候希望可能是一种情绪反应。但有时这可能是一种评估性偏好。例如，我希望有一个可持续发展的未来。即使我找不到对人类可持续发展的未来感到乐观的基础，我还是希望它，而这种希望可以是我评估判断的产物，而不是情绪反应。这是针对您的账户吗?还是我误解了?在我看来，在这种情况下，我不会接受霍普不理智的说法。 Indeed, under those conditions, I'd see Optimism as irrational. I suspect there are some cases when hope would be irrational. If nothing else, there can be situations when a majority of people are hopeful about, say, democracy, because they've been taught to prefer it, but they don't understand it well. And, yes, I suspect their irrational hope can make a difference, helping us become more democratic. As a longtime Critical Thinking teacher, I may be biased here; but I'm inclined to treat such irrational cases as vulnerable. When hope (or optimism) is irrational I fear it can make a negative difference as well as a positive difference. For example, if a group doesn't have a clear understanding of democracy, their democratic hopes might, in the end, promote an undemocratic future. I vaguely remember a Star Trek episode that touched on that subject. But, I'd resist the claim that hope always is irrational and emotional. I'd also resist the claim that optimism is passive, though it can take that form. Maybe this is a way to think about it: Hope risks irrationality and Optimism risks passivity.

再次感谢。我在想我需要找到一个方法在我的课堂上讨论这个话题。当我们在古代课堂上讨论斯多葛主义时(即当我们讨论爱比克泰德对期望和命运的描述时)，我已经提到了一点。但我认为我的许多学生都在努力解决这些问题，这是可以理解的。用这种方式来结束我的批判性思维课会很有趣。但我主要考虑的是在《哲学导论》中讲述它。Thanks again,

So the pair are defined by the opposite of what they're risking, by your account. Optimism should be active and hope should be rational, and when one or the other is undertaken, there's a good chance, that is, a risk, that they won't be. If the claim is of an active principle which can become passive if executant, it is self-contradictory and therefore senseless. But if one considers it as a much weaker claim that it's a mere "way to think about it", as stated above, it's hard to disagree with, even if taking up the suggested way of thinking has already seemed to preclude to it any attribution of logical validity. The problem with expressing the pair as a dichotomy, inquired about at the beginning, is narrowly defined as two sides of the same coin, --that negation of one is affirmation of the other. Your commentary thereupon however covers several different points, and is worth reviewing below:

Your argument, while complex, can be paraphrased in my view as follows:
1) There's a distinction between bases of one's relation to expectations: lacking and not lacking (Second sentence).
2) Hope is both an emotional reaction and an evaluative preference (a preference which is preceded by deliberation).
3) Hope is rational where its preference-contents are evaluated, as in the example of a hope for continued human survival. (Your question here (ninth sentence) about whether this is "speaking to my account" can not be answered, since the use of the preposition "to" is unclear as to whether it applies to an indirect or direct object).
4) Preference contents (--for absent objects, it should be noted, as one can't hope for what one already has) are evaluated, therefore hope is (in more than one but not in all cases) rational.

--This is where by my reading the main argument concludes. The second argument challenges the claim that hope and optimism can work together, by showing how irrational hopes, described as those whose object is not well understood, cause more harm than good. In the provided example of hope for democracy, the evidence of its truth as an inductive claim is irrefutable. This challenge from content-deficient hopes however can certainly be accommodated by content-sufficient hopes, as in the example of those based on vocationally based employment, showing both to be compatible with the original assertion of probability-assessment's unidirectionality with preferred absent-object selectivity.

With regards to the main argument though the question can still be asked: Where does hope-rationality stand with respect to objects of collective hopes for unlikely objects? Might one be limited to aesthetic criteria as grounds for action where not enough scientific grounds can be found?

斯坦福哲学百科全书是一个很好的开始这些展览的地方当我对这个话题不熟悉的时候，这里就是这样。世界杯赛程2022赛程表欧洲区

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hope/

关于希望，有一个标准的模型、定义和一些当代的观点。希望的本质似乎是不断变化的，气候就是一个很好的例子。尽管如此，它可能太大了，以至于无法定义那些看起来过于熟悉、沉浸在历史之中、依赖于你个人的哲学观点的东西。一个禁欲主义者，一个基督徒，和理查德·罗蒂走进一家酒吧……有很多不同的笑点。

I did pick up Jeniffer Morton's book 'Moving Up without Losing Your Way: The Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility.' This book has little to do with optimism directly, but there has been quite a bit written on it elsewhere. I would say a few critical words about her book, but it would go off-topic here.

正如迈克尔所建议的那样，消除“希望和乐观”的歧义对我来说是一个良好的开端，这将归结为对结果的情感参与。希望意味着在某些(如果不是全部)结果中涉及个人利益。乐观在很大程度上是归纳的，而不一定是前瞻性的，尽管乐观和希望可以有助于一个人的态度。

不管乐观是不是理性，理性就是不总是乐观。关于悲观和非理性的讨论似乎也偏离了轨道，但这只是第一印象。用对立的概念把世界涂成黑与白是很容易的，但问题不是黑与白。是乐观理性吗?- seems grey to me given the many different takes on hope.

应该给孩子们机会，让他们安全地失败，鼓励他们，并给他们相当大的余地，让他们找到自己的态度和道路。这条路越不理性越好。

这里似乎没有多少共同点。希望、绝望、身份、意图、期待、权力，以及善良的旧、新的恶，都必须被消除和理解，才能说出乐观主义是否合理。如果一个人相信外部力量，认同更大的社会运动，或拥有它们在世界上的能动，这种观点将决定乐观主义是否可能。这些力量、运动或机构的有效性将决定乐观主义是否是理性的。由于上述任何一个标准的失败，它都可能是非理性的和乐观的。

Recently Matt Ridley and Hans Rosling wrote books about Rational Optimism and Factfulness. Those words are still prophetic in terms of overall human welfare. We are better off, in human terms, than we used to be. However, human terms are short-lived when attitude drives action and success instead of focusing on the overall impacts of our self-centered projects. In retrospect, I'm not sure just how rational Ridley and Rosling were. The challenge in the future does not call for optimism and rationality so much as realism.

I'm curious about this show as well. I don't have a handle on my attitudes here and less and less elsewhere.

Because it can be safely assumed that a substantial measure of anticipatory forecast accompanies broadcast expectations with regards to the program-topic under discussion, it could be said that sufficient conditions have been set up, once key terms are defined, to conduct an experiment in the phenomenon of Optimism which holds the promise of determining whether it makes sense to talk about it as a human reality which produces verifiable results, or is just a manner of speaking and has no bearing on potential effects of collaborative work and constructive behaviors. In limiting the conditions for result-verification to the least possible number, it is useful to limit the question asked to one between two incompatible views. If one assumes conditions of impending approach of undesirable objects, Optimism is either comfort or axiom, and does not indicate a capacity for determining the probability of existence of hoped-for objects. The question should rather be limited to a relation of the subject to the reference-content, to determine whether it is based on comfort as space for reflection, or on axiom as time for concentrated activity. As the design is to determine whether its truest existence or best reference is one or the other, the notion of rationality is not necessary.

Twice above have participants expressed anticipation of the broadcast outcome, and these can be seen as expressions which contain elements and ingredients of what is called optimism. The question regarding these and other such expressions is whether they are based on comfort or on axiom. And this can be determined by experiment, which in this case is where each portion of participatory activity constituting what is called a "post" constitutes a contribution to a quantification of the result. On some specified date near the broadcast they can be tallied up so that a majority is determined, and by extension whether it is a strong or weak majority. This can then be checked against the eventual broadcast's contents, to see if the majority view appears. Only in the case of it both doing so and being the tallied majority can one say, with reliability confirmed by experiment, that it's the case.

Optimism has to do with desired objects in future time. And one can be disposed towards the future in at least two distinct ways: anticipating it by active preparation, or awaiting it in passive inaction. As such, optimism has to be about something important. Its use in language indicates that it's always a matter of collective or generic import, and subsequently reflects the social conditions of its relevant context. I've argued above that optimism is a passive relation to an awaited object in future time. Hence it constitutes a comfort-concept with respect to relevant conditions of social control, and expresses confidence in their arrangement with regards to the respective desired object. That's one vote for optimism's predication by sociological comfort in reassurance of other's efforts besides one's own. Are there plausible alternates for optimism which assert an axiomatic characteristic actively anticipating its object?

Was Caesar optimistic about victory over Pompey before crossing the Rubicon? If so, he was confident, and this confidence acted as an axiom for his decision. But if he was not confident about future victory, but nevertheless crossed, this indicates that he really didn't want to, and his generals (or centurions) had to give him a push, being themselves optimistic about high positions in a Caesarian government. So can optimism be described, as this example suggests, as an epiphenomenon of historical events where to whom it belongs remains hidden? Was Plato for example optimistic about his Syracuse adventure or was it Tyrant Dionysius's optimism about learning mathematics that was the key inspiration to Plato's excursion? And if this arose from confidence in the truth of Plato's theories, was it on the part of both participants, or just one? On the occasion of Heidegger's 80'th birthday Arendt describes his support for German fascism in its early years in a similar way, so that optimism equates to apologetics. Here optimism is just a way to express a positive valence for an imposed adverse situation, and as such is a classical tool of repression. There's a line in a song from the 1980's that runs "I'm proud to be an American, where at least I know I'm free". The second clause is the optimistic one, expressed in epistemic terms. It takes the form of finding something good in a bad situation, expressed as willful ignorance of the given non-optimistic.

In the forthcoming article "Resisting Pessimism Traps; The Limits of Believing in One's Self" in the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Professor Morton describes a pessimism phenomenon which in aggregate constitutes a set of aspiration-hobbling snares called "pessimism traps", whose evidence-confirmation mechanism is defective because the countervailing decision, the optimistic one, involving greater risk but more comprehensive achievement, can't be tested. In consequence, uncritical presuppositions are automatically imported into post-decision evaluation as having been confirmed, since the lesser goal is nevertheless a valuable one.

通过阅读这篇文章，我总结出了四种避免这些陷阱的方法:一种是无条件的，即目标的确定不依赖于潜在成功的证据;社会责任:社会责任，源于对处于类似不利处境的其他人的义务;一种认识论，风险的可接受性仅被排除在与其不可接受性的分歧超出不合理的边界之外;以及斯多葛主义的方式，在这种方式中，目的论的考虑被无限期地搁置起来，以促进条件-全体性的接受。

While not getting into Morton's conclusion, it seems to me that of the four, only the Stoical way allows itself to tinker with a goal's decision-preconditions as a way of avoiding the trap of the choice of a lesser goal without sufficient evidence for rejecting the greater. For this the example of college application may be useful. Insofar as this can involve the risk of post-graduate default on loans taken out to cover the cost of what is called "tuition", the unconditionalist is either confident in the abstract that it can be repaid or doesn't care about defaulting, the sociologicalist will strive to repay it on behalf of the example it sets for others, the epistemicist can calculate repayment-likelihood by determining that it's not unreasonable to disagree with the chorus of advisories saying that it's unlikely, but only the Stoic can suspend the goal without abandoning it until that one condition is removed, so that associated risks no longer factor into any decision to pursue such a goal, and economic disadvantage as a factor in the trap to be avoided is precluded. The goal is the same, and only its acceptability under certain conditions has changed. Collective interest is appealed to prior to the individual's interest and related topical aspirations. A strike in discussions of collective labor action employs similar reasoning, where the goal of changing conditions in the workplace overrides individual interests for short-term compensation. The stoic approach could then be renamed the collectivist approach, so that pessimism-trap avoidance is assisted by the elimination of economic conditions for their occurrence. If a scenario is considered where many enrolled college-level students could take up a stoical attitude about graduation dates, the example could be carried a little further to ask: does the most rational optimism for avoiding the pessimism trap of assuming failure of student-loan repayment most readily take the form of a student strike against the sale of accredited education, i.e. tuition?

I will try again: there are those now saying consciousness is illusion. Others claim rationality meets that description. Optimism? Well, if optimism is also an illusion, then, hope; love; aspiration; and therefore beliefs, in themselves, are illusions. Did Davidson intend to say this when he called such things propositional attidudes? I don't think so. Nor do I think he might have imagined them to be re-interpreted in that frame. Some forms of truth and reality are time-sensitive. Many others are not.

Reply to participant Neuman's analysis of time-sensitivity and illusion in the 7/26/22-post above: The claim is that some truths are time-sensitive, such as whether or not person x is optimistic about situation y at time t, and some are not, such as the truth that two beans added to two pebbles amount to four items. But does the former apply to time with regards to what's sensed, or to change? If person x is optimistic about situation y at time t but not about situation y at time t' , the optimism becomes of the past but the situation has not changed. But if person x is no longer optimistic about situation y' at time t', the situation has changed, so that the duration of situation y is an illusion, but not the optimism, which disappears accordingly as the situation becomes a new situation. Time sensitivity is by this described, then, as a measure of situation-duration, or a change-barometer which therefore could be with good reason called a "temporometer". Mathematical truths do not show up on the temporometer, indicating no change for the duration of the measure. But a truth such as "the planet is getting warmer" would by contrast show a high measure of change, altered as it is with further conditions which can be identified. So is participant Neuman here suggesting that optimism and the other qualities associated with human consciousness can be determined with respect to their ontological status by the mere application of a well constructed temporometer?

The discussion ranged over three areas: psychological, rational, and collective. Study of optimism as a psychological property of a person is paired with pessimism, for which evidence can be gathered as to the causes of each, e.g. a particular kind of upbringing, et al. Falling outside of emphasis on predication of the subject however is the question of whether one set of objects is appropriate or not.

我认为乐观主义的哲学研究可以解释这些领域是否存在的问题，Morton提供了两个案例供我们思考:一个是关于终末医疗诊断案例的理性选择模型，另一个是关于气候变化案例中基于对悲观抵抗的集体应对必要性的集体行动模型。第一个例子表明，乐观世界杯赛程2022赛程表欧洲区主义是如何破坏理性选择的，在理性选择中，忽视让自己的效果井然有序的做法，是由于对结果抱有积极的希望，这种希望如此不可能以至于不合理，是由于对自己的生理持续时间的偏见，而不是对他人的担忧和自己死后的受欢迎程度。不管观察到的心理特性如何，最终诊断的案例提供了一个例子，说明乐观主义是建立在错误对象的基础上的非理性。

另一方面，在气候变化的案例中，莫顿为乐观主义的合理性提供了一个例子，即拥有正确的对象，但错误的对象无法实现。I read her argument in two parts:
1) In cases where collective action is assumed as necessary, justified judgements of probability are precluded to individuals, since only in concert can such judgements be supplied with sufficient evidence. The rational object determines the conditions for the judging subject by excluding individuals.
2)由于孤立的个体只能非理性地判断需要集体行动的事物的积极可能性，而在个体悲观的情况下，个体却只能对集体事物的不可能做出消极的判断。如果拒绝非集体的积极乐观主义，则接受支持个人的悲观抵制主义，因此，集体乐观主义的对象只有在受到非悲观主体制约的情况下才是理性的。在此基础上，我阅读了兰迪教授关于气候变化的讽刺文章，将其称为“小思想家的远大期望”，也就是说，只有当足够多的人相信这不能由他们自己或其他人(比如能源公司的CEO)完成时，对更大目标的远大期望才成为可能。个人的自我否定等于集体的共同肯定。

然而，应该注意的是，这两个例子都提出了为什么以及是否存在乐观主义这样的问题，但它可以从紧急情况的质量中收集，这是由双方共有的，它存在于或出现的威胁感，而不是从愿望不受紧急情况的影响。

After all the foregoing, and admitting I have not read most of the comments, I wonder if whether or not optimism is a requirement is merely academic. Moreover, the notion of rationality (reason) does not seem reliant on a reasoning person being, or need be, optimistic about potentials/outcomes of that faculty. One state of being does not appear to require the other. What am I not getting here?

嗨,蒂姆。一段时间。我的注意力一直放在其他问题上，这里没有提到。其他的信息来源根本不是无所不知的——有些甚至是彻头彻尾的疯狂。正如所暗示的，如果不是明确的，我的观点认为乐观主义和理性是不重叠的权威。你可以只拥有一个而不拥有另一个。所以，在我看来，这个问题并不是正确的。如果允许的话，我可以回PT。但不是现在。寻找考夫曼、利特尔、梅斯纳等人。 Not advertising the venue here. Do not wish to burn bridges.
Always, warmest regards,
HGN.

理性是由理性所规定或仅由概念所规定的事物所具有的性质。因此，乐观主义是否合理的问题本身是抽象的，几乎是荒谬的。但我们可以探究某些被认为是乐观的行动方针的合理性。例如，在终末期诊断的案例中，概念本身，既有经验的，如血液测试的结果，也有非经验的，如生物尸检对活着的个体来说是不可避免的，它们决定了一个行动过程比另一个行动过程的合理性，而不需要与患者所做决定的内在合理性相关联的经验的帮助。因此，理性是一种客观性，并包含一种不依赖于个人经验的有效性要求。与气候变化的例子类似，只是将从归纳中收集的概念放在一起，就产生了一个合理的行动方案的建议，而无需参考吸入野火烟雾或遭受中暑的相关经验。另一方面，乐观主义的合理性作为一个普遍概念的问题，只有当人们问乐观主义和合理性是否是同一件事时才有意义。如果是这样，参与者诺伊曼的互不重叠的条件将被满足。

In the interest of summary, and to assist in providing some exportable form to the meandering forgoing, corrections and notation of deficiencies are welcomed from the forum's coauthors and interested others.

这一页以可选的客观形式为前提，以及某些对象或对象的组合已经是最好的，所以一个人的未来与它/它们有关是一个理论问题，取决于一个人对它/它们的了解。关于明显的和预期的特征的敏感和易怒描述了理论倾向和认识适应之间的对应关系，而不是期望的对象和其可能性的估计。

然而，当可预见对象的范围缩小到只有那些对个人或集体构成毁灭威胁的对象时，一个有利或不利的处置就变成了一个实际问题，其选择是由理论基础决定的。在实践中，即使成功的可能性很小，不利的处置也会被排除在外，因为人们在拒绝其他选择时仍会押注于此。Climate change turns out to be just such a case, and suggestion is made that human rights be expanded to include vegetables, which would have the effect of protecting forested areas which are needed as a component of a solution.

康德在《纯粹理性的准则》(The Canon of Pure Reason)的第二节中也提出了类似的区别，包括可以知道什么(理论性的)、应该做什么(实践性的)以及可以期望什么(理论性的和实践性的)。如果有人在实践意义上值得赞扬地提倡人类在不久的将来在陆地条件下生存，以便可以放弃足以排除替代物的理论依据，那么，看来第三个问题包含了对理论理性领域的实际立法的希望，但只有在不能避免灭绝的危险的情况下。